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ABSTRACT
Pain, suffering, anxiety, and other experiences are fundamentally
important to civil and criminal law. Despite their importance, we have limited
ability to measure experiences, even though legal proceedings turn on such
measurements every day. Fortunately, technological advances in neuroscience
are improving our ability to measure experiences and will do so more
dramatically in what I call "the experiential future."
In this Article, I describe how new technologies will improve our
assessments of physical pain, emotional distress, and a variety of psychiatric
disorders. I also describe more particular techniques to help determine
whether: (1) a patient is in a persistent vegetative state, (2) a placebo
treatment relieves pain, (3) an alleged victim has been abused as a child, (4)
an inmate being executed is in pain, (5) an interrogatee has been tortured, and
more. I argue that as new technologies emerge to better reveal people's
experiences, virtually every area of the law should do more to take these
experiences into account.
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INTRODUCTION
Subjective experience is fundamentally important to the law. We craft laws
to make us feel happier and safer and help us avoid conflicts that cause misery
and grief. When conflicts inevitably arise, litigants frequently claim that they
have been wrongfully made to feel pain, sadness, fear, or anxiety. The
outcomes of legal adjudication can also cause negative experiences, as when
courts issue injunctions or sentence offenders to prison. There are few
generalizations that apply to the law as a whole, but one is that virtually every
aspect of the law affects people's feelings, emotions, and other experiences.
Though our experiences are critically important to the law, they cannot be
observed directly. People try to express their feelings and emotions, but we are
suspicious of their claims, especially when they have financial incentives to lie
or exaggerate. Even when speaking truthfully, the nature and intensity of
one's feelings are very difficult to convey. Despite our limited ability to judge
the experiences of others, legal proceedings turn on such judgments every day.
Fortunately, technological advances in neuroscience are beginning to
provide more accurate methods of measuring experiences. In 2007, I described
how, in principle, brain imaging techniques could be used to more objectively
assess a litigant's pain. One year later, a patent was granted on an alleged
method of using brain imaging to measure pain.2 During that same year, brain
imaging evidence of pain was readied for battle in a worker's compensation
dispute, though the case settled soon thereafter.3 In early 2010, the Applied
fMRI Institute became the first commercial enterprise to offer brain scanning
services to assess pain.4 And pain is just one of the many experiences, like
1 Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433
(2007) [hereinafter Kolber, Pain Detection]; see also Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and
Property: Some Possible Legal and Social Implications ofAdvances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND
THE LAW 114, 141-42 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (noting the possibility that neuroimaging could help assess
pain).
2 Objective Determinations of Chronic Pain in Patients, U.S. Patent No. 7,462,155 B2 (filed Oct. 27,
2004) (issued Dec. 9, 2008); see also Brenda Simon, Patent on Pain Detection?, LAW & BlOscIENCEs BLOG
(Jan. 28, 2009), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2009/01/28/patent-on-pain-detection
(discussing the patent).
3 Greg Miller, Brain Scans of Pain Raise Questions for the Law, 323 SCIENCE 195 (2009) (describing
how parties sought expert witnesses to testify about fMRI evidence purportedly showing that an employee's
chemical bums caused him chronic pain).
4 At least, I am not aware of any other company that has previously offered such services. See Services,
APPLIED FMRI INSTITUTE, http://www.appliedfiri.org/services.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011) [hereinafter
APPLIED FMRI INSTITUTE]. Applied fMRI no longer advertises brain-based pain assessment on its website, id.,
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distress, depression, and anxiety, for which we are working to develop more
objective measurements. While there is much debate about when these
technologies will be ready for courtroom use, litigants will no doubt seek to
introduce such evidence in the near future.
In this Article, I describe some of the ways in which new technologies are
shifting the way we measure experiences and will continue to do so more
dramatically over the next thirty years. I discuss in general terms how new
technologies may improve our assessments of physical pain, pain relief,
emotional distress, and a variety of psychiatric disorders. I also discuss more
particular applications of such technologies to assess whether: (1) a patient is
in a persistent vegetative state, (2) a placebo treatment relieves pain, (3) an
alleged victim has been abused as a child, (4) an inmate being executed is in
pain, (5) an interrogatee has been tortured, and others.
My central claim is that as new technologies emerge to better reveal
people's experiences, the law ought to do more to take these experiences into
account. In tort and criminal law, we often ignore or downplay the importance
of subjective experience. This is no surprise. During the hundreds of years in
which these bodies of law developed, we had very poor methods of making
inferences about the experiences of others. As we get better at measuring
experiences, however, I make the normative claim that we ought to change
fundamental aspects of the law to take better account of people's experiences.
In Part I, "The Importance of Subjective Experience," I briefly explain why
subjective experience is so important to the law. Indeed, if classical
utilitarianism is correct, everything of value depends on subjective experience,
and the law should help us maximize good experiences. But even if classical
utilitarians overstate the importance of subjective experience, the nature and
quality of our experiences are undoubtedly critical to any account of what
makes our lives valuable. For the law to connect with the important aspects of
our lives, it must attend to subjective experience.
While some of the most exciting technologies to help us assess experiences
are nowhere near ready for forensic use, in Part II, "The Experiential Present,"
I describe some of the assessment technologies already available in our
primitive experiential present. For example, though we do not typically think
but such assessments are now being marketed by Chronic Pain Diagnostics, Inc., see Pain Measurement
Through Objective Testing, CHRONIC PAIN DIAGNOSTICS, INC., https://chronicpd.com/Home.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2011).
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that an X-ray of a broken leg reveals subjective experience, it surely tells us
something about a person's pain. Emerging technologies will enable us to
make inferences about others' experiences more frequently and with greater
precision. These technologies may never be perfect. But they don't have to
be. They need only be cost-effective supplements to the very crude methods
we use today.
In Part III, "The Experiential Future," I argue that as better methods of
measuring experiences emerge, they can and should revolutionize many areas
of civil and criminal litigation. In the tort context, this argument is easy to
make. Both current law and our best theories of tort law treat experiences like
pain and suffering as generally relevant to damage assessments. If we remain
consistent with this prevailing view in the future, the content of the law should
change in rather dramatic ways. Instead of the rough proxy measures of
experience that have become embedded in the law over many years, we can
turn to new technologies that help us measure experience more directly.
In criminal justice contexts, by contrast, there is a conflict between
prevailing law and our best theories of why we punish offenders. Prevailing
law suggests that we can generally ignore victim and offender experiences or
consider them to a very limited degree. I will argue that prevailing law is
misguided and inconsistent with our best efforts to justify punishment. If we
seek just punishment practices, then we must consider subjective experience
more than we do now. The experiential future will make it easier to measure
both the amount of harm caused by crime perpetrators and the amount of
punishment they should subsequently receive.
Given the breadth of this Article, I can only scratch the surface of the many
areas of the law that should change in the experiential future (and in many
cases, I refer readers to more detailed discussion that I have provided
elsewhere). But this Article will paint a picture of what the future will look
like if the law pays better attention to subjective experience, as I argue it
should. While dramatic technological advances are still some time away,
thinking about our experiential future, I argue, can help us better understand
and apply the law even today.
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked that "[t]he life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." Quite inadvertently, Holmes's
5 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881). Holmes argued
that judges decide cases pragmatically and are influenced by their prejudices and life experiences. Judges do
2011] 589
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
comment also applies to our experiential future, for the life of the law largely
has been and will continue to be about measuring, monitoring, manipulating,
permitting, and prohibiting certain experiences. In the experiential future, we
will have better measures of subjective experience and plenty of reason to
revise the law to focus more directly and explicitly on those experiences.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECTIWE EXPERIENCE
When crafting law, we implicitly make value judgments about the
importance of subjective experience. Consider two prominent views of tort
law. On one view, tort law promotes corrective justice. Those who tortiously
6
cause injury must compensate their victims to make them whole. To decide
what it means to make a victim whole, we must make a value judgment. If we
require tortfeasors to compensate victims for their pain and suffering, we have
implicitly decided that those experiences have disvalue.
Alternatively, suppose that tort law is supposed to deter bad behavior. If
so, we seek to prohibit activities when their expected costs exceed their
expected benefits. We use tort law to encourage people to internalize the risks
7
of harm they create by forcing them to pay for those harms should they arise.
To do this, we must decide what outcomes count as costs that must be
internalized. If we require tortfeasors to internalize the costs of the pain and
suffering they cause, we have implicitly decided that those experiences have
disvalue. In other words, under some widely held views of tort law, we must
8decide whether or not experiential harms matter.
Classical utilitarians have a clear answer. On their view, experiences are
all that ultimately matter. The good-that which is of value-consists in
experiences like happiness and pleasure, while the bad-that which is of
disvalue-consists in experiences like sadness and pain.9  To choose the
morally correct action, including the right law or policy, we should try to
not, as many theorists claimed, formalistically deduce outcomes in particular cases by applying case facts to
the law. See Moses J. Aronson, Book Review, 20 TEx. L. REv. 118 (1942) (reviewing MAX RADIN, LAW AS
LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE (1940)) (discussing controversy over the proper interpretation of Holmes's statement).
6 See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 256, 271 (1989) (discussing the corrective justice rationale for tort law).
7 See, e.g., Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REv. 987, 990 (2008) (stating that, from an economic
perspective, the primary objective of tort law is to deter behavior that unjustifiably risks causing harm).
I discuss these and other possible goals of tort law in more detail in Part III.A infra.
9 See, e.g., JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 7-8
(1986); WLL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 13 (2d ed. 2002).
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maximize net happiness or pleasure. Though difficult to implement, the
formula is extraordinarily generalizable, applying to everything we do. If the
classical utilitarian view is correct, nothing is more important to the law than
experiences because all value depends on experiences. 10
Classical utilitarians may oversimplify our experiential palette. We value
other more complicated experiences like empathy, creativity, and spontaneity
that are not easily categorized as kinds of happiness or pleasure. But the core
idea behind classical utilitarianism-that everything of value depends on our
experiences-has substantial appeal. Many of our life goals revolve around
obtaining certain kinds of experiences. For most of human history, daily life
has been consumed with efforts to avoid the pains of hunger and thirst. Even
those who are well nourished strive to avoid chronic pain and emotional
distress. We cannot explain why these experiences are bad solely in terms of
some other potential locus of disvalue, like a deprivation of liberty. A solitary
person can still have bad experiences, even when no one interferes with his
liberty.
By contrast, to enjoy anything, including some liberty, we must experience
it. That which is entirely outside our range of experiences cannot affect us, at
least not in any way that we ever come to recognize.11  We cannot value
liberties that no one is aware of; such liberties are only valuable, if at all, in a
very impersonal way. Perhaps nothing is of value without a person to value it,
and some fact about the world that never enters conscious experience has no
one to value it. In a world without creatures that have experiences-a world of
sophisticated but unfeeling robots, for example-we might think there is
nothing of value at all.
The idea that value consists solely of subjective experience has been
sharply attacked, however. Robert Nozick famously proposed a thought
experiment intended to elicit the intuition that more things in fact matter to us
10 I am describing classical utilitarians as value hedonists rather than welfare hedonists. Value hedonists
believe that "pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain the only intrinsic evil." SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE
Enmcs 31 (1998). Welfare hedonists believe that our well-being-the quality of our own lives-depends only
on experiences, while acknowledging (contra value hedonists) that there are other forms of value in the world,
like ethical value or the value of mathematical truths, that do not depend solely on experiences. See id
11 See JAMES HILLMAN & MICHAEL VENTURA, WE'VE HAD A HUNDRED YEARS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND
THE WORLD'S GETTING WORSE 62 (1993) ("[W]hat we are really, and the reality we live, is our psychic
reality .... ); John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583,1594-95 (2010).
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than just experiences.12 Nozick asked us to imagine being connected to a
machine that can give us any set of experiences we want:
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any
experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting
book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes
attached to your brain. Should you plu into this machine for life,
preprogramming your life's experiences?
Before we answer, Nozick put aside some concerns that are not relevant to the
thought experiment:
If you are worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can
suppose that business enterprises have researched thoroughly the
lives of many others. You can pick and choose from their large
library or smorgasbord of such experiences, selecting your life's
experiences for, say, the next two years. After two years have
passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to
select the experiences of your next two years. Of course, while in the
tank you won't know that you're there; you'll think it's all actually
happening. Others can also plug in to have the experiences they
want, so there's no need to stay unplugged to serve them.14
Despite the machine's ability to give us whatever experiences we might want,
Nozick argued that we would not plug in to it. According to Nozick, the fact
that we would not connect is evidence that we in fact value more things than
just experiences. "Perhaps what we desire," he claimed, "is to live ... in
contact with reality."15
Nozick's thought experiment is widely treated as a thorough refutation of
the view that experiential states are all that matter.16 As I have argued
elsewhere,17 however, the thought experiment is hardly so successful. Even if
12 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974). Nozick's thought experiment builds
on a similar one proposed by J. J. C. Smart. See J. J. C. Smart, An Outline ofa System of Utilitarian Ethics, in
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 1, 19-22 (J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973).
13 Smart, supra note 12, at 42.
14 Id. at 42-43.
15 Id. at 45.
16 See, e.g., KYMLiCKA, supra note 9, at 13.
17 Adam Kolber, Mental Statism and the Experience Machine, BARD J. Soc. SCI., Winter 1994-95, at 10
[hereinafter Kolber, Mental Statism]; see also Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting. The Legal and Ethical
Implications ofMemory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1561, 1605 n.226 (2006).
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most people would say that they would not connect to an experience machine,
we cannot necessarily treat such responses as reflecting people's considered
judgments. In particular, we may be biased by the particular formulation of the
thought experiment. For example, people may simply prefer the set of
experiences in the world that they currently inhabit over the set of experiences
they anticipate having if they were connected to an experience machine. Their
intuitive reactions to the thought experiment may reflect a bias for our status
quo experiences, rather than a deep, meaningful preference for the non-
experiential value of living in the real world.
To illustrate our status quo bias, I have argued, we should consider the
experience machine scenario in reverse, thereby switching the status quo.
Suppose that you were told that you are currently hooked up to an experience
machine. All of your friends and family do not really exist and all of your
accomplishments up to this point never actually happened. Instead, in the real
world, you are someone else who has different friends, family, and
accomplishments than you currently perceive yourself to have. Moreover, you
are told that your life in the real world has significantly worse experiences than
your current life on the machine (otherwise you would not have connected in
the first place). Indeed, for all you know, you may in fact be connected to an
experience machine right now.19 The revised formulation of the question is:
would you disconnect if you believed that you were currently connected to an
experience machine?
20
While most people share Nozick's original intuition that they would not
connect to the machine, far fewer would disconnect from a machine to which
they were already connected. Indeed, some recent work in experimental
philosophy tested this intuition by asking subjects a reverse-experience-
machine question like the one I proposed. Depending on how life off of the
experience machine was described in the experiment, between 46% and 87%
of subjects would remain connected to an experience machine.21 Given that
many of us would remain connected to an experience machine to which we
were already connected, Nozick's original formulation of the thought
experiment may elicit, at least to some extent, a preference for our status quo
Kolber, Mental Statism, supra note 17, at 15.
19 Id
20 id.
21 Felipe De Brigard, If You Like It, Does It Matter iflt's Real?, 23 PHiL. PSYCHOL. 43, 47-48 (2010).
2011] 593
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
mode of living rather than a considered judgment that more matters to us than
just experiences.
Still, even if Nozick's thought experiment fails to clearly establish that we
care about more than just subjective experience, we may indeed care about
other things. Robert Hare pointed out that we prefer to live in a world in which
our spouses are faithful, even if we never discover their adultery and even if
22the adultery has no effect on our subjective experience. Once again, our
intuitions in Hare's example may be biased by the thought experiment or just
be plain wrong, but it is very difficult to prove that experiences are all that
matter.
Importantly, however, nothing I will say about the experiential future
depends on the claim that experiences are the only things that matter. Though I
have sought to show that subjective experience is very important to our lives,
we may, rightly or wrongly, care about other things as well. What is
indisputable is that some experiences are valuable and some are disvaluable.
As Shelly Kagan has stated, "[P]retty much everyone believes at least this
much: the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain is at least one
component of well-being. (It is quite hard to deny this. The value of pleasure
and the disvalue of pain seem virtually self-evident to anyone experiencing
them.)" 23 Martha Nussbaum, for example, has offered a rather objective list of
"functional capabilities" that she takes to be central to human life;24 still, many
of the capabilities she lists are intimately connected to human experience, like
"[n]ot having one's emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and
anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect."2 5  Even deontologists
must count experiences as sources of value or disvalue "if only to flesh out the
'duty of beneficence' that is standardly included among the 'right things' to be
22 R. M. HARE, ESSAYS ON PHLosoPIcAL METHOD 131 (1971).
23 KAGAN, supra note 10, at 30; see also Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal
Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17, 23 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds.,
1991) (recognizing conscious states as among the things that are important to us); Peter Railton, Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 134, 149 (1984) (identifying
"happiness, knowledge, purposeful activity, autonomy, solidarity, respect, and beauty" as "intrinsically"
valuable); cf DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AN) PERSONS 4 (1984) (stating that, even for objective theories of self-
interest, "happiness and pleasure are at least part of what makes our lives go better for us, and misery and pain
are at least part of what makes our lives go worse").
24 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-80
(2000).
25 Id. at 79.
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done." 26  If subjective experience is even instrumentally relevant to one's
theory of the good, one cannot entirely ignore our experiential future.
So long as pain and suffering are generally disvaluable (even if other things
are disvaluable too), we must consider them when crafting law and
adjudicating cases. To return to the discussion of tort law, if tort law is
supposed to promote corrective justice, defendants who tortiously cause pain
and suffering must compensate plaintiffs for those bad experiences. Similarly,
if tort law is supposed to optimally deter bad activities, then defendants who
risk excessive experiential harms must compensate plaintiffs for those bad
experiences.27 Thus, on any prevailing view of tort law, subjective experience
matters. Of course, to the extent that measuring subjective experience in
individual cases is impossible or cost prohibitive, we have to settle for second-
best solutions. But as new technologies facilitate measurement, our second-
best solutions become less and less defensible.
II. THE EXPERIENTIAL PRESENT
We already have some technologies that help us assess the experiences of
other people. When we see an X-ray of a shattered leg, for example, we can
generally infer that the person with the shattered leg was in great pain soon
after his injury. Traditional diagnostic imaging, however, provides only weak
and inexact evidence about our experiences. For example, many people with
genuine back pain have no abnormal anatomical findings, while many people
28
without back pain do show spine-related abnormalities.
While courts wrestled at first with decisions to admit diagnostic images,29
today courts regularly admit X-rays, CT scans, and MRIs to provide insight
into the extent of a person's pain and suffering.30  Advances in imaging
26 Robert E. Goodin, Utility and the Good, in A CoMPANION To ETmcs 241, 241 (Peter Singer ed., 1991).
27 To give people proper incentives, we should focus not on the actual harms they cause but on the harms
they should have anticipated. Nevertheless, our best evidence of what harms ought to have been expected will
often depend on the actual harms that occur. See infra Part III.A.
28 See Gina Kolata, With Costs Rising, Treating Back Pain Often Seems Futile, N.Y. TIEs, Feb. 9, 2004,
at Al (noting a researcher's claim that "[a] variety of studies have suggested that in 85 percent of cases it is
impossible to say why a person's back hurts").
29 See Anthony R. Benedetto, Not Just "X-Rays" Today: Recommendations for Admissibility of Modern
Radiology Images, 49 S. TEX. L. REv. 113, 126-27 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and
Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 209-15 (2007).
30 See, e.g., Jack E. Hubbard & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., "Show Me the Pain": Limitations and Pitfalls of
Medical Imaging of the Low Back, 14 MicH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 129 (2010) (describing a variety of diagnostic
imaging tests that sometimes provide good evidence of low back pain).
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technology may eventually provide far better evidence of people's subjective
states by focusing less on body tissue like bone and muscle and more on the
brain, where we process most of the information related to our experiences. In
this Part, I briefly describe some of the technologies that can help us infer the
experiences of other people.
A. Measuring Physical Pain
Experiences like pain are private in the following sense: I am a better
authority on what I am immediately experiencing at a given moment than
anyone else. I know how I am feeling through introspection, while others
have to make inferences about my experiences based on my behavior or other
indirect clues. These inferences may be wrong. A person who seems to be in
pain may be lying to gain a favorable settlement or to avoid work obligations.
Others, like stroke victims or young children, may be incapable of expressing
their feelings.32
Doctors and researchers have long sought to make more accurate
assessments of pain. For example, clinicians regularly ask patients to rate their
pain on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 is the worst pain imaginable. 33 But two
people who experience pain of the same intensity may nevertheless refer to
their pain with different numbers. Among other reasons, one patient may have
a very vivid imagination about the worst pain imaginable and, therefore,
31 I call this the "Walking in Memphis" principle. In a song of the same name, singer Marc Cohn asks,
"[D]o I really feel the way I feel?" MARC COHN, Walking in Memphis, on MARC COHN (Atlantic Records
1991). The answer is, "yes," he really does feel the way he feels. In fact, it is arguably impossible for it to be
otherwise. I discuss the topic of neuroscience and pain measurement in more detail in Kolber, Pain Detection,
supra note 1.
32 We must nevertheless make judgments under uncertainty about the pain of creatures that cannot
communicate. For example, Nebraska controversially banned the abortion of fetuses at twenty weeks'
gestational age, citing a legislative finding that such fetuses may experience pain. Pain-Capable Unborn Child
Protection Act, NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-3,104 (2010). Even soon after we are born, there is disagreement about
the nature of the pain we experience. See, e.g., Janice Lander et al., Comparison ofRing Block Dorsal Penile
Nerve Block, and Topical Anesthesia for Neonatal Circumcision, 278 JAMA 2157, 2161 (1997)
(recommending that newborns receive anesthesia prior to circumcision). And, of course, there are continuing
debates over the moral and legal significance of the pain of nonhuman animals. See Adam Kolber, Note,
Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing ofHumans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REv. 163, 182-88
(2001) (describing Peter Singer's view that we must give equal consideration to the interests of all creatures
that experience pain). All of these issues will be better informed in the experiential future.
33 See, e.g., PATRICK WALL, PAIN: THE SCIENCE OF SUFFERING 11-12 (2000); Eric Eich et al., Questions
Concerning Pain, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 155, 162 (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1999).
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systematically rate his pain lower than someone else with a less vivid
imagination.
Despite the notorious difficulties of making intersubjective assessments of
experience,34 we nevertheless make them every day. When we observe a child
cry, we infer that the child is in pain. When we see a litigant laboriously
hobble up to the witness stand, we infer that he is having difficulty moving or
at least wants to seem that way. If intersubjective experiential assessments
were entirely impossible, we would be hard-pressed to justify our current tort
practices.
New technologies will never eliminate the difficulties of making
intersubjective assessments. In the future, however, our assessments of others'
experiences will improve. In recent years, researchers have made tremendous
strides in identifying neural correlates of the experience of pain.35 Some of
these techniques use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the
brain, which is similar to the more familiar structural MRI of the brain that
36hospitals have been using for over twenty years. While structural MRI
reveals brain anatomy, like whether a person has a tumor or signs of a head
injury, fMRI reveals which portions of a person's brain are especially active
under particular conditions. 37
When imaging brain function in subjects experiencing pain, researchers
observe increased activation in specific parts of the brain, including certain
regions of the cortex.38  The amount of activation observed depends on the
intensity of the pain.3 9  For example, one team of researchers had subjects
34 See, e.g., GRFFiN, supra note 9, at 106-24; Scanlon, supra note 23, at 17.
35 See, e.g., David Borsook & Lino Becerra, Functional Imaging of Pain and Analgesia-A Valid
Diagnostic Tool?, 117 PAIN 247 (2005); Robert C. Coghill et al., Pain Intensity Processing Within the Human
Brain: A Bilateral, Distributed Mechanism, 82 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1934 (1999); E. A. Moulton et al.,
Regional Intensive and Temporal Patterns of Functional MRI Activation Distinguishing Noxious and
Innocuous Contact Heat, 93 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 2183 (2005); Carlo A. Porro, Functional Imaging and
Pain: Behavior, Perception, and Modulation, 9 NEUROSCIENTIST 354, 357 (2003); I. Tracey, Imaging Pain,
101 BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA 32 (2008).
36 See Hubbard & Hodge, supra note 30, at 149 (noting that MRI was approved by the FDA in 1986).
37 JAMiE WARD, THE STUDENT'S GUIDE TO COGNITIvE NEUROSCIENCE 49-56 (2006).
38 See, e.g., Pierre Rainville et al., Pain Affect Encoded in Human Anterior Cingulate but Not
Somatosensory Cortex, 277 SCIENCE 968, 969 (1997) (using positron emission tomography to support
"previous findings of significant pain-related activations" in the primary and secondary somatosensory
cortices, the rostral insula, and the anterior cingulate cortex); Tor D. Wager et al., Placebo-Induced Changes in
JMRI in the Anticipation and Experience of Pain, 303 SCIENCE 1162, 1162 (2004) ("Pain responsive regions,
or the 'pain matrix,' include thalamus, somatosensory cortex, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex.").
39 See Coghill et al., supra note 35, at 1936; Porro, supra note 35, at 357.
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touch a hot piece of metal and report the pain they experienced using a 1-to-10
pain scale.40  Based on subjects' self-reported pain, each subject was placed
into a high, medium, or low pain sensitivity group. Subjects were later
exposed to the same heat stimulus during an fMRI scan. Consistent with their
self-reports, subjects in the high sensitivity group, on average, showed greater
activation in the parts of the brain used to process pain than did the subjects in
the low sensitivity group.4 1
More recently, researchers have shown how the amount of brain activity in
the insula closely correlates with the subjective pain reports of individual
subjects.42 A team of researchers describing the work state that "the brain
activity ... in this insular region reflects the magnitude of subjective pain
every time a participant[] indicates that individual's perceived magnitude of
pain, with a linear correlation between brain activity and magnitude of
subjective perception."4 3 That's precisely the kind of work that may someday
lead fMRI evidence of pain into the courtroom.
While the research I have so far described focuses on acute pain,
researchers have also used neuroimaging to identify structural changes in the
brain associated with chronic pain.44  In a 2004 study, Vania Apkarian and
colleagues used traditional MRI to identify structural differences in the brains
of a group of people with chronic back pain compared to the brains of a group
without back pain.45 On average, the group with chronic back pain had a lower
volume of neocortical grey matter than did the pain-free group.46 Moreover,
40 Robert C. Coghill et al., Neural Correlates of Interindividual Differences in the Subjective Experience
ofPain, 100 PROC. NAT'LACAD. Sci. 8538, 8538 (2003).
41 Id. at 8539-42.
42 See M. N. Baliki et al., Parsing Pain Perception Between Nociceptive Representation and Magnitude
Estimation, 101 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 875, 880 fig.4 (2009).
43 A. Vania Apkarian et al., Pain and the Brain: Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain in Clinical
Chronic Pain, 152 PAIN (Supp. 3) S49, S50 (2011); see also Andre Marquand et al., Quantitative Prediction of
Subjective Pain Intensity from Whole-Brain fMRI Data Using Gaussian Processes, 49 NEUROIMAGE 2178
(2010) (using fMRI brain data and machine learning algorithms to predict the level of pain an individual
subject will report from a painful stimulus).
44 See Karen D. Davis, Recent Advances and Future Prospects in Neuroimaging of Acute and Chronic
Pain, 1 FuTuRE NEUROLOGY 203 (2006); Arne May, Chronic Pain May Change the Structure of the Brain,
137 PAIN7, 12 (2008).
45 A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back Pain Is Associated with Decreased Prefrontal and Thalamic
Gray Matter Density, 24 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10410, 10410-11 (2004).
46 Id. at 10410-13.
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the study identified a positive relationship between how long subjects had
chronic pain and how much brain volume they lost.47
Perhaps most impressive, Apkarian and colleagues were recently able to
distinguish a group of subjects with chronic back pain from a group of subjects
without chronic back pain by examining how subjects responded to acute
48pain. When the groups were exposed to a painful heat stimulus, they had
largely similar brain activity under fMRI.49 In one particular region of the
brain, however, the nucleus accumbens, researchers found dramatically
different responses to the cessation of the heat stimulus in back pain sufferers
50
relative to healthy controls. The researchers claim that this signal
"distinguishes the two groups at a very high rate of sensitivity and specificity,
implying that this signal can be used as an objective marker of chronic pain."51
All of these techniques for measuring pain are at an early stage of
development, however, and require further elaboration and replication. Even
though a number of researchers have patented neuroscientific methods of
measuring pain,52 and fMRI pain evidence has begun to trickle into pretrial
litigation,53 such technologies have numerous obstacles to overcome before
they are ready for use in the clinic or the courtroom.
47 Id.; see also Paul Y. Geha et al., The Brain in Chronic CRPS Pain: Abnormal Gray-White Matter
Interactions in Emotional and Autonomic Regions, 60 NEURON 570 (2008) (identifying structural differences
in the brains of those with chronic regional pain syndrome).
48 Marwan N. Baliki et al., Predicting Value of Pain and Analgesia: Nucleus Accumbens Response to
Noxious Stimuli Changes in the Presence of Chronic Pain, 66 NEURON 149, 149 (2010).
49 Id. at 151.
50 Id. at 151-53. The researchers suspect that when chronic pain sufferers are exposed to acute pain, they
are momentarily relieved of their chronic pain. Because the cessation of acute pain leads to the return of
chronic pain, the reward centers of their brains do not treat the cessation of acute pain as being rewarding in
the same way that healthy subjects do. Id at 156-57. Whatever the reason, so long as the difference can
reliably be identified, we might someday be able to use fMRI to distinguish those with genuine chronic back
pain from those without it.
51 Id. at 157; see also DONNA LLOYD ET AL., HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., DEVELOPMENT OF FUNCTIONAL
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (FMRI) TO MEASURE THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM RESPONSE TO
CHRONIC BACK PAIN (2005), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr394.pdf
52 As noted, a patent was granted on a method of using functional magnetic resonance imaging to
measure pain more objectively. See '155 Patent, supra note 2. Other recent patents related to pain-assessment
include: Assembly and Method for Objectively Measuring Pain in a Subject, U.S. Patent No. 6,018,675 (filed
May 22, 1998) (issued Jan. 25, 2000), and Method and Apparatus for Objectively Measuring Pain, Pain
Treatment and Other Related Techniques, U.S. Patent No. 6,907,280 (filed Mar. 30, 2001) (issued June 14,
2005).
53 See Miller, supra note 3.
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There are five major obstacles to using these emerging techniques to assess
pain. First, most-but not all-brain imaging research examines average
features of a group of subjects relative to average features of another group. In
order to use brain imaging in forensic contexts, we ideally seek assessments of
the experiences of particular people, not groups of people. Second, individual
brains vary quite a bit, and it is not yet clear whether we will be able to find
distinct biological markers of pain that are good enough for the courtroom.
Third, when looking at chronic pain and brain structure, we do not know if
chronic pain causes changes in brain structure or whether those with particular
brain structures are at greater risk of developing chronic pain. Either way, the
brain data might be useful in assessing whether a particular litigant has genuine
pain. But our inability to answer such basic questions reminds us that this
research is still at an early stage. Fourth, pain is multifaceted, having sensory,
affective, and cognitive components.54 Pain can be caused by physical trauma
or have psychogenic origins. For the foreseeable future, these brain imaging
technologies are unlikely to recognize nuanced variations in pain affect and
etiology. Fifth, whatever technology is developed to detect malingered pain
may be subject to countermeasures. If people can easily cheat, the technique
will not be useful in the courtroom. Techniques that rely on functional brain
imaging may be particularly susceptible to countermeasures because we have
56
some control over our own brain activity. By contrast, tests that examine
structural features of the brain will be much harder to fool.
Though these techniques need considerable refinement, remember that we
are not very good at assessing pain today. We have poor data on rates of pain
malingering, and we don't know the error rates of pain assessments made by
judges, jurors, doctors, and insurance examiners. How can we even say that
brain-based methods of pain assessment are worse than the ones we use now if
we don't know the error rates of our current assessment techniques? In order
for new technologies to inform our clinical and forensic assessments, they need
54 See Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 436-37.
55 Id
56 Compare R. Christopher deCharms et al., Control over Brain Activation and Pain Learned by Using
Real-Time Functional MRI, 102 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 18626, 18626 (2005) (suggesting that, with training,
we can develop some control over our acute pain and, hence, the way that our pain appears under fMRI), with
Stuart W.G. Derbyshire et al., Cerebral Activation During Hypnotically Induced and Imagined Pain, 23
NEUROIMAGE 392 (2004) (suggesting that, absent coaching, merely imagining pain will not appear the same
under fMRI as actually experiencing pain).
57 See Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 434 n.5 (citing some limited data on malingering).
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only provide cost-effective ways of improving our current methods of pain
assessment. To do that, they hardly need to be perfect.
B. "Mind Reading" Technologies
New technologies will tell us about other experiences aside from just pain.
Later on, I will discuss several such techniques as they relate to particular areas
of the law. For example, I will discuss epigenetic evidence of childhood abuse
and adversity, electroencephalographic evidence of the anesthetic depth of
those being executed, and a variety of methods of assessing emotional distress,
including the extreme suffering associated with torture.
There are also other methods of inferring people's experiential states that
could somewhat sensationally be called "mind reading." If such techniques
become successful, they will not enable us to "see" experiences in any literal
sense, but they will enable us to make better inferences about experiences
than we could without them. I briefly discuss two of these efforts here.
1. Diagnosing Disorders of Consciousness
In 2006, researchers used fMRI to help assess the mental activity of a
woman believed to be in a persistent vegetative state.59 When the woman was
scanned and asked to imagine engaging in certain actions like playing tennis or
navigating rooms in her house, her brain activity looked remarkably similar to
the activity in healthy control subjects who imagined engaging in the same
activities.60 One researcher declared that the study provides "knock-down,
61drag-out" evidence of the patient's conscious experiences.
Even though the study was not specifically designed to assess subjective
experience, it still provides some evidence of the subject's experiential life.
For example, we now have some reason (though certainly not conclusive
reason) to believe that the woman has had the experience of hearing the voice
ss Cf Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations ofLaw and Neuroscience, 2010
U. ILL. L. REv. 1211, 1225-45 (criticizing legal scholars who blur conceptual differences between mind and
brain).
59 Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE 1402, 1402 (2006).
60 Id
61 Benedict Carey, Mental Activity Seen in a Brain Gravely Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al
(quoting Nicholas Schiff, a neuroscientist at Weill Cornell Medical College) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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of the researchers and has had the experience of imagining herself engaging in
activities like playing tennis and walking around her home.
More recently, very similar techniques were used to communicate with a
62
man who, for five years, was believed to be in a vegetative state. The man
was instructed to think about, for example, playing tennis to give a "yes"l
63
response and navigating his home to give a "no" response. Using this
technique, the patient correctly answered simple questions like: "Do you have
any brothers?" 64  The research shows that our ability to identify people's
mental states, including their experiences, is improving dramatically. We can
certainly expect that, in the experiential future, imaging techniques will
provide increasingly helpful information about the experiences of people who
are unable to communicate. Indeed, we might be able to use this very
technique to ask minimally conscious patients whether they are in pain.65
2. Lie Detection
Researchers are also working to develop mind reading technologies of
more general application, including technologies that detect deception. One
older and not very successful method of detecting deception relies on the
polygraph. Polygraphs measure a subject's pulse, blood pressure, respiration,
and skin conductance while the subject is being questioned.66 Some think that
these physiological responses reflect a subject's level of stress and anxiety
during questioning and that these experiential indicators provide evidence of
67
whether or not the subject is lying. Interestingly, polygraphs measure
62 See Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness, 362
NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 580-81 (2010); Benedict Carey, Trace of Thought Is Found in 'Vegetative' Patient,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at Al.
63 Monti et al., supra note 62, at 581.
64 Carey, supra note 62.
65 While we cannot assume that minimally conscious patients will provide veridical answers, we can
never automatically accept anyone else's pain reports as truthful and accurate. We can nevertheless have good
grounds to trust people's answers. If, for example, the pain description of some cognitively impaired person is
indistinguishable from the descriptions of unimpaired people in a Turing-style test, see Graham Oppy & David
Dowe, The Turing Test, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 13, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/turing-test, we will have good reason to trust the impaired person's pain reports, at least absent good
evidence to the contrary.
66 Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 39, 40.
67 Cf Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to Be True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 491 (2008) (noting that polygraphs measure autonomic arousal).
602 [Vol. 60
THE EXPERIENTIAL FUTURE OF THE LAW
indicators of subjective experience in order to make some further inference
about a subject's truthfulness.
Polygraphs are generally considered unreliable at detecting deception.68
Most courts are reluctant to admit evidence from polygraph tests,6 9 and the
Supreme Court has held that rules of evidence that categorically ban admission
of polygraph data do not violate defendants' constitutional rights.
Importantly, however, polygraphs may be reasonably accurate tools to assess
experiences like stress and anxiety. Most criticism of polygraphs concerns the
subsequent inference that stress and anxiety can provide evidence of deception.
After all, even accurate assessments of stress and anxiety may be poor
predictors of deception.
Researchers are trying to develop more accurate methods of detecting
deception using brain imaging.71  While many in the scientific community
doubt that current brain-based methods of lie detection are sufficiently accurate
and reliable to use in forensic contexts, that has stopped neither companies
from marketing fMRI lie detection services to the public, 72 nor litigants from
trying to introduce such evidence in court.73
Even if current lie detection technology is too inaccurate to rely on in court,
we already have good reason to think about future uses of such technology.
Given the substantial possibility that we will develop reasonably accurate lie
detectors within the next thirty years, our current secretive behaviors have
already become harder to hide. A person in the year 2011 who visits a strip
club, cheats on his spouse, evades taxes, or murders someone can surely be
68 Cf id ("Estimates of [polygraph] accuracy range from a high of 95 percent to a low of 50 percent,
with the best estimate probably around 75 percent sensitivity and 65 percent specificity." (footnote omitted)).
69 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 (1998) ("Most States maintain per se rules excluding
polygraph evidence.").
70 Id. at 305-07.
71 See, e.g., Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 430 (2008); Wolpe et al., supra note 66,
at 39.
72 See, e.g., APPLIED FMRI INSTITUTE, supra note 4; Lie Detection, CEPHOS, http://www.cephoscorp.
com/lie-detection/index.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); No LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com (last visited Oct. 29,
2010).
73 See United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 18, 33-39 (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 2010) (Pham, Mag.,
report and recommendation), available at http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/files/2010/06/fMRI-
Report-and-Recommendationl.pdf (recommending that allegedly exculpatory fMRI lie detection evidence be
excluded in a health care fraud case as insufficiently reliable and lacking sufficient probative value to
outweigh its risk of prejudicial effect); Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (excluding fMRI lie detection evidence in an employment discrimination case principally on the ground
that witness credibility is a jury question).
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asked thirty years later about his thoughts and conduct throughout the course
of his life. The "look-back" potential of accurate lie detection reduces the
probability that our current thoughts and behavior will remain secret in coming
decades.
In contrast to polygraphy, brain-based methods of lie detection do not
necessarily rely on subjective experience as an intermediary. Some approaches
focus on cognitive activity that might indicate deception,74 and such cognition
is not typically thought of as experiential. Still, if these lie detection
techniques prove reliable, they will surely influence our experiential future.
Instead of using the crude techniques we have now to determine if, say, a
plaintiff is malingering pain, we could ask the plaintiff if he is experiencing
pain while assessing whether he is telling the truth.
Importantly, however, even if we do develop good methods of detecting
deception, we will still want other methods of measuring people's experiences
75that do not rely on self-reports. For even when we have no reason to lie or
exaggerate, we cannot easily convey the nature and intensity of our own
experiences. We may be the ultimate authorities about our own experiences,
but we can still benefit from technologies that convey the nature of our
experiences in more objective terms.
III. TIE EXPERIENTIAL FUTURE
Though we should pay a great deal of attention to subjective experience,
the law often ignores the experiences of litigants, claimants, prison inmates,
and crime victims. In the experiential present, we can blame these failings on
the costs and other difficulties of measurement. In the future, however, such
measurements will become cheaper and easier. In this Part, I survey just a few
of the ways in which subjective experience is important to the law and argue
that as measurements of experience become more reliable and cost-effective,
the law should do more to take them into account.
74 Simpson, supra note 67, at 493-94 (noting the hypothesis that additional brain activity in deception
conditions may reflect the increased cognitive load required to withhold truthful information); cf Daniel D.
Langleben, Detection ofDeception withfrMR: Are We There Yet?, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1,
4 (2008) ("[T]he model postulating that suppression of the prepotent truth is the only basic mechanism of
[lying], needs to be revised.").
7 Moreover, there are arguably criminal contexts in which the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination would permit us to measure a defendant's experiences but not to query his experiences using lie
detection techniques.
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A. Tort Contexts
In Part I, I argued that experiences are so fundamentally important to our
lives that they have to count among the things in the world that have value or
disvalue. So, theories of tort law, for example, must count bad experiences
among the various harms and costs we inflict on each other. Precisely how tort
law should consider subjective experience, however, depends on the details of
one's preferred theory of torts.
Some scholars justify tort law as a form of corrective justice. When a
tortfeasor wrongfully injures his victim, he must compensate the victim for the
past injustice.76 Among the injuries that require compensation, we must count
various forms of pain and suffering because such experiences are highly
disvalued. So those who defend a corrective justice account of tort law must
measure the pain and suffering of victims in order to ensure that they are justly
compensated for their injuries.77
Other scholars provide an economic analysis of tort law.78 They believe
tort law should encourage socially beneficial behavior by forcing people to
internalize the risks of harm they create. Since pain and suffering represent
kinds of harm, we can use tort law to prohibit behaviors that cause excessive
risk of pain and suffering.79 Tort law does this by forcing those who create
excessive risks of pain and suffering to pay compensation for those harms if
they subsequently arise. Thus, those who defend an economic analysis of tort
law must take account of experiential harm to give people incentives to only
76 Cf JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 329 (1992) ("Corrective justice imposes a duty to repair
wrongful losses on those agents responsible for them.").
7 There is much disagreement about whether we should only be held responsible for harms to the extent
we culpably cause them or whether we should be responsible for harms we cause more generally, even when
harms are aggravated by factors beyond our control. See MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993). If we only
care about a tortfeasor's antecedent beliefs (or lack thereof) about the harms he risks causing, then the actual
experiential harms he causes will be less important. Still, these actual harms will often provide the best
evidence of the magnitude of harm that the tortfeasor knowingly risked causing.
7 The intellectual heritage of economic analyses of law can be traced back to classical utilitarianism.
According to Richard Posner, "Modem economics has given up on trying to measure utility, because such
measurement requires information about people's preferences and emotions that seems unobtainable."
RIcHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 96 (2001). I claim, of course, that utility will become at
least somewhat easier to assess in the experiential future.
79 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 186-87
(1987) ("By awarding damages for 'pain and suffering' . . . tort judges and jurors implicitly recognize ... that
pain and the kind of suffering that ensues when one loses an arm or a leg, is blinded, or suffers some other
grievous and permanent (or long-lasting) injury inflict real even though nonpecuniary cost.")
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risk causing such harm when doing so is expected to create greater offsetting
benefits.
Since no one can perfectly predict the future, those seeking optimal
deterrence could argue that we should focus not on actual experiential harms
but on those that should have been expected. For example, suppose a surgeon
can perform many more operations if he is willing to increase his rate of error.
To decide how quickly to work, we want his decision to reflect the expected
societal benefits of performing quick operations relative to their expected
societal costs. Such determinations are made not by assessing the experiences
of individual litigants, but by aggregating data about the bad experiences of
others who are pertinently like a particular patient. Nevertheless, even in those
cases where we care about expected bad experiences, our best evidence of what
a tortfeasor should have expected will often depend on what his victim actually
experiences. So a court that seeks optimal deterrence, rather than corrective
justice, might still assess the propriety of a surgeon's decision, in part, by
considering actual harmful consequences to particular victims.
Many who defend an economic analysis of tort law believe that, in addition
to deterrence, tort law can also help efficiently allocate losses. For example,
suppose there is an extremely small risk that some widget will injure
consumers. We use tort law to force the manufacturer to bear the risk of harm
from the widget because the manufacturer can more efficiently spread the cost
of product-related injuries. Typically, the price of the widget will implicitly
reflect a small premium that every customer pays in order to, in effect, buy
insurance against the widget's dangerous malfunction.so
While economic analysts of tort law widely agree that tortfeasors should
internalize pain-and-suffering costs in order to promote optimal deterrence,
there is much disagreement about whether we should permit pain-and-suffering
damages at all when considering tort law's insurance function. A number of
scholars have argued that rational consumers generally do not seek insurance
80 See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J.
353, 362 (1988).
81 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1553
(1987) ("To obtain optimal incentives for injury prevention, a party that has violated a legal standard must pay
full losses to the victim, including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses."); Robert Cooter, Towards a
Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383, 396 (1989) ("[A]n efficient tort system creates
incentives for people not to impose pain and suffering upon others.").
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for pain and suffering.82 For example, while many people buy insurance to
help cover the costs of medical treatment, they don't buy insurance against the
pain and suffering frequently associated with illness. 83  Similarly, though
parents no doubt suffer terribly upon the death of a child, they generally do not
purchase insurance on the lives of their children. 8 4
Other economic analysts have argued that we should compensate pain and
suffering to further tort law's insurance function.ss There is evidence that
people do, in fact, insure against risks of pain and suffering and that the
absence of formal policy coverage for pain and suffering may be due to market
impediments.86 Indeed, in two surveys of consumer preferences about the
harms caused by dangerous products, the vast majority of subjects expressed
demand for pain-and-suffering insurance and had the same or similar demand
for pain-and-suffering coverage as they did for monetary insurance.87
But even if consumers would not insure against risks of pain and suffering,
they are certainly not indifferent to such experiences. Just as people who
refrain from buying life insurance still value their lives, people who refrain
from buying insurance against pain and suffering still value the absence of
those experiences; there is simply insufficient demand to support a market for
pain and suffering insurance. If the price of insuring against pain and suffering
through the tort system is too high, then we ought not use tort law to insure
against pain and suffering. The deterrence and corrective justice rationales for
providing pain-and-suffering damages, however, would remain.
82 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 81, at 1546-47, 1553; Cooter, supra note 81, at 392 ("[A] rational person
would insure only against that pain and suffering that curtailed earnings.").
83 See Priest, supra note 81, at 1547 ("[T]here is no market for pain and suffering insurance in any
society in the world.").
84 Id. at 1546; Schwartz, supra note 80, at 365.
85 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-and-Suffering Damages Be Abolished from Tort Law? More
Experimental Evidence, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 941, 977 (2005) (presenting evidence "that even on pure
insurance grounds, the preferable default rule is to provide for some pain-and-suffering damages"); Steven P.
Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law,
108 HARv. L. REv. 1785 (1995).
86 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 76, at 421 (suggesting that first party pain-and-suffering insurance
may not exist because insurance companies fear fraudulent claims); Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient
Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 41, 73 n.149
(1990) (noting that insurance companies do sell accidental death and dismemberment policies as well as
uninsured motorist coverage, both of which provide compensation for nonpecuniary losses); Avraham, supra
note 85, at 945-54; cf Schwartz, supra note 80, at 365 (recognizing mixed empirical evidence that consumers
seek to insure against pain and suffering and discussing impediments to creating such insurance).
87 See Avraham, supra note 85, at 962, 966-67, 975.
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The precise ways in which we should consider subjective experience,
including how much we must individualize our measurements, will vary
depending on one's preferred theory of tort law. Whatever theory one prefers,
however, positive law is quite clear. Unlike many areas of the law that use
only very rough proxies to measure experience, the tort system at least purports
to require assessments of the pain and suffering of individual litigants.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, fact-finders are supposed to
estimate fair and reasonable compensation for pain and suffering by noting
"such factors as the intensity of the pain or humiliation, its actual or probable
,,88 lwdeduration and the expectable consequences. Tort law does not rely on a fixed
schedule of compensation of, say, $10,000 for the pain of a broken arm or
$20,000 for the pain of a broken leg. Rather, despite the difficulties of
measurement,89 as a matter of law, we are supposed to actually measure
amounts of pain and suffering. No matter one's theory of tort law, the
dominant view of tort compensation is that damages are supposed to return
individual plaintiffs to the status quo ante, a determination that requires an
individualized experiential assessment.90
1. Physical Pain
Given that at least positive law requires individualized experiential
measurements, in the not-so-distant future, we may use some of the
neuroimaging techniques described in Part I to help assess physical pain. Such
techniques might help to confirm or disconfirm claims that a person's pain is
entirely malingered, even if these techniques are still too inaccurate to reveal
much more than that. While the reliability of the technology will no doubt be
challenged in court, it will be accepted more readily if the medical community
uses it for other purposes, like diagnosis. For example, doctors might seek
more objective confirmation of a patient's pain before prescribing narcotics for
relief. Such widespread use would help bring down the cost of the technology
and likely improve its accuracy over time.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1977).
89 Id. ("[I]t is impossible to require anything approximating certainty of amount even as to past harm.").
90 See 1 MARIYN MINZERET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.01 (2010) ("The general purpose of
compensatory damages in tort actions is to give the injured party a sum of money which will restore him, as
nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in if the wrong had not been committed; in other words,
to make the plaintiff whole."); see also Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659,
660-61 (2003) (stating that "a dominant theme" among legal academics and practitioners is that tort law is
designed to return plaintiffs to the status quo ante).
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In the more distant future, we may be able to assess how much pain a
person is experiencing. That is far more difficult than assessing whether a
patient who purports to have serious pain is entirely malingering. If we
examine two people with brains that are essentially identical, except that one
brain shows more activity in regions associated with pain, we might have good
grounds to infer that the person whose brain shows greater activity in these
regions is also experiencing more pain than the other person. In real life,
however, no two people have brains that are so alike. As we compare people
with brains that are increasingly diverse, it becomes more difficult to make
comparative determinations of their experiences. Nevertheless, as our
understanding of brain structure and function improves, we will slowly get
better at making such comparisons.91
a. Incorporating New Technologies into Law
To see how new pain assessment technologies may change the law, we can
examine the effects of related technologies in recent history. Technologies to
measure drunk driving may be instructive. One way to assess people's
experiences is to test their levels of intoxication. If a person scores very high
on a blood alcohol test, he is probably experiencing symptoms like dizziness,
nausea, or lethargy. Generally speaking, we don't use blood alcohol tests in
order to assess experiences. Rather, we use them to measure cognitive
impairments that happen to correlate with intoxication-related experiences.
Presumably, we don't care if you are dizzy, nauseous, or lethargic while
driving, so long as these experiences do not create a danger.92
Even though we do not use intoxication tests to assess subjective
experience, such tests nevertheless offer important lessons about the ways that
more quantifiable measuring tools may affect our experiential future.93 Early
drunk driving statutes set the prohibited level of intoxication using vague legal
standards, making it a crime for a person to drive "under the influence of
91 Indeed, we make such comparisons all the time. Consider some experience from the recent past that
caused you physical pain. Suppose you were faced with the prospect of having the experience again. All else
being equal, you would likely infer that you would experience pain similar to the pain you felt the last time.
You would make such an inference despite the fact that your brain has changed, at least subtly, since you last
had the painful experience.
92 Even so, the subjective experience of intoxication may still be relevant to drunk driving penalties.
Drivers who experience symptoms of intoxication may be more on notice of their cognitive impairments and
hence more deserving of punishment than intoxicated drivers who have no unusual bodily sensations to warn
them of their impaired condition.
93 This discussion benefited substantially from conversations with Jennifer Mnookin.
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intoxicants to such an extent that his ability to drive with safety to himself and
others [was] thereby materially impaired."9 4 In the early days of automobiles,
police officers had to rely on hard-to-quantify methods of assessing a driver's
intoxication: the officer would smell the driver's breath and observe his
behavior. In time, police, courts, and legislatures started relying on blood tests
and breath tests to assess impairment. Legislatures embraced these new
technologies by modifying drunk driving statutes that had relied solely on
vague standards of intoxication to also include a much more clearly defined
rule. It became illegal to drive with a blood alcohol content above the statutory
level.95
Thus, the history of drunk driving law may foreshadow an experiential
future where the law changes to accommodate new technology. When we
shifted from relying on primitive techniques to assess impairment, like
smelling alcohol on a driver's breath, the law adapted accordingly. Instead of
defining prohibited conduct with only a vague, hard-to-measure legal standard,
the law began to prohibit conduct defined explicitly in terms of the newer,
more easily quantifiable technology.96 If this lesson applies to new techniques
to measure pain and other experiences, these techniques may spark changes in
the law to take advantage of the more precise information they make available.
In a world with more precise units of pain, for example, the role of juries
might change. Rather than have juries assess damage awards for pain as they
do now-by estimating reasonable compensation-we might develop some set
of policies to convert amounts of pain that are caused negligently or
intentionally into amounts of compensation. Jurors will still have plenty of
work to do, but once they find that a tort has occurred and caused a certain
level of pain, we may have more uniform methods of calculating an
94 Owens v. Commonwealth, 136 S.E. 765, 766-67 (Va. 1927); see also Commonwealth v. Lyseth, 146
N.E. 18, 18 (Mass. 1925) (making it a crime merely to drive "under the influence of intoxicating liquor").
9 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) ("Whoever ... operates a motor
vehicle with a percentage, by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one-hundredths or greater .. . shall be
punished. .. .").
96 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(a) (2007) ("A person shall not drive or be in actual physical
control of any moving vehicle while ... [t]he person's alcohol concentration is 0.08 grams or more . . . ."). Of
course, breath tests do not perfectly measure impairment. Not everyone who drives with a particular blood
alcohol level is impaired to the same degree. Current breath tests may well be replaced by some better
technology in the future.
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appropriate level of pain compensation that depends quite directly on the
technology we use to measure pain.97
b. Novel Legal Questions About Pain Compensation
If we could better measure pain, we might seek standardized units in which
to describe it.98 This is no easy task, as pain has a variety of sensory
components (for example, duration, texture, and intensity) and a variety of
associated emotions.99  Since we are currently unable to disentangle these
aspects of pain, we presumably lump them all together and let jurors do their
best to assign a total dollar value. If we were better able to measure pain,
however, we might seek alternative methods of pricing pain or pain
components.
We might even seek to disentangle the amount of pain a person feels from
his ability to tolerate it. Perhaps we will someday distinguish between a
person who is feeling a lot of pain but is good at tolerating it from another
person who is, in some sense, feeling the same amount of pain but tolerating it
poorly. If we could make such a distinction (and I make no claim that we can
or should), the law would have to determine precisely what sorts of
experiences should be compensated and whether pain tolerance is relevant.
Currently, however, we are so dependent on rough proxies for pain that the law
does not address these more fine-grained questions about how various aspects
of pain contribute to the total compensation litigants should receive.
The burgeoning literature on hedonic psychology points to other features of
pain we might need to address in the experiential future. Hedonic
psychologists study how we can increase happiness and reduce pain and
9 There are two important caveats here. First, litigants may have constitutional rights to jury trials that
are potentially implicated by more uniform methods of calculating damages. Second, uniform methods of
converting amounts of pain to dollars risk ignoring another important aspect of subjective experience.
Namely, plaintiffs vary in the relative value they assign to dollars. Corrective justice involves both injury and
compensation. If we seek to provide accurate compensation, we must consider the subjective value of both
injury and award. Cf Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1391,
1394 (2009) (arguing that entitlement allocations, to be fair or efficient, must take account of the relative
intensity of preferences for the entitlements).
98 Law student Evan Fisher, commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, suggested that I call these
units of pain "Kolbers." According to Fisher, "Many professors of law knowingly or unknowingly make their
names synonymous with anguish, but few have such a legitimate opportunity." E-mail from T. Evan Fisher to
author (Sept. 20, 2010, 12:11 CET) (on file with author).
99 Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 436-37.
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suffering. 100 They have found, for example, that our evaluations of a painful
episode depend especially on the peak intensity of pain during the episode and
the amount of pain felt at the end of the episode. So, patients will remember a
colonoscopy as being less painful if the colonoscopy lasts longer than usual,
provided that the pain at the end of the procedure is comparatively lower. 101
Patients will even be more likely to return for follow-up colonoscopies in
future years when the longer procedure is used.1 02
Based on this evidence, we might think that public health advocates should
encourage doctors to use the longer procedure. But notice that the longer
procedure actually causes more pain in total. So the public policy
recommendation forces us to decide whose pain counts: Is it the pain of the
person undergoing the procedure? Or, is it the remembered pain of the person
who, years later, decides whether to schedule a follow-up colonoscopy?103
In the experiential future, this broad public policy question may be raised
as to individual litigants. A defendant who negligently exposed his former
employee to carcinogenic substances may be liable to pay for the pain and
suffering associated with future colonoscopies. Do we consider the total
amount of pain experienced during the procedure, or do we focus on the
amount of pain the plaintiff-employee will remember afterwards? A precise,
detailed calculation of his damages requires us to address the difficult value
questions raised by work in hedonic psychology.104 In our primitive
experiential present, however, our estimates of pain and suffering are so rough
that these more detailed issues are usually ignored.
c. Measuring Baselines
Whenever we assess the magnitude of an injury, we must consider not only
a person's condition at some post-injury endpoint-for example, pain at the
doctor's office or when in court-but must also examine his baseline
1oo See, e.g., Eich et al., supra note 33, at 160; Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic
Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745, 760 (2007).
101 Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Memories of Colonoscopy: A Randomized Trial, 104 PAIN 187, 189-93
(2003).
102 Id.
103 See Peter H. Huang, Should Law & Policy Favor Our Experiencing or Remembering Selves? Insights
from Happiness Studies & Neuroscience (Sept. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
104 See Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of "Welfare," 33 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 391,
398-411 (2005).
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condition.105 If a plaintiff has 20 units of pain after a leg injury, his harm is 20
units in magnitude, provided that he had no pain in his baseline condition. But
if the plaintiff already had 5 units of pain from a preexisting chronic condition
and has a total of 20 units of pain after the injury, then the injury caused him
15 units of pain, representing the amount of harm caused by the defendant's
*106
negligence.
The fact that pain assessment requires at least two measurements makes
such assessments especially difficult. Even with the best possible technology
to measure people's experiential states after some injury, we cannot accurately
assess the amount of harm caused by that injury unless we know the injured
person's baseline condition. This measurement challenge is not
insurmountable, however. Presumably, we simply assume that, absent
evidence to the contrary, injured people had normal, ordinary baseline
conditions.
We face the same baseline problem today. If you injure my leg, we will
generally assume that my leg was pain-free prior to the injury, absent evidence
to the contrary. Such assumptions may be less accurate for certain kinds of
experiences, like anxiety and panic, if people vary to a greater degree in their
baseline conditions. Nevertheless, even if we can only improve our post-injury
assessments and remain stuck with our poor baseline assessments, we would
still be better off in the experiential future, since now we must engage in very
rough estimates of both baseline and post-injury conditions. And who knows
what the future will bring? Perhaps someday we will all have regular medical
check-ups that gather data about our baseline conditions. What our
experiential future will be like depends largely on how far into the future we
care to look.
105 See, e.g., 1 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 33-36, 204 (1984) (describing harm as a setback to
interests); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1565 (2009)
[hereinafter Kolber, Comparative Nature] (arguing that the severity of punishment must also be measured as a
setback from a baseline position); id at 1579-81 (challenging Seana Shiffrin's noncomparative conception of
harm).
106 The system of measuring pain I describe is greatly oversimplified for ease of explication. Presumably,
forensic measurement of the pain of an injury would look at levels of pain over periods of time, including
expected future levels of pain. In addition, there is an important debate about whether compensation baselines
should be determined using a historical baseline (the plaintiffs condition just before the injury) or a
counterfactual baseline (the condition the plaintiff would have been in but for the defendant's tortious
conduct). See JOEL FEINBERG, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in FREEDOM AND
FULFJLLMENT 3, 7 (1992).
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d. Administrative Compensation Schemes
While the tort system generally purports to assess individualized levels of
physical pain, the same is not true for worker's compensation, disability, and
other administrative schemes that typically do not compensate claimants for
pain as such.107 Under many compensation schemes, pain serves merely as
evidence of some other condition that the compensation scheme does
remedy.1os For example, worker's compensation schemes typically provide
compensation for a particular injury without considering the varied amounts of
distress the injury causes.109 These schemes often provide a certain number of
weeks' pay for a particular injury described at a fairly abstract, impersonal
level. 110
Compensation schemes with schedules of payment likely save on
transaction costs. It is expensive to examine patients and determine their pain
and suffering. In the experiential future, however, pain and suffering will be
cheaper and easier to measure. We will then have greater reason for these
schemes to consider subjective experience than they have now. For example,
if we ever develop a good system to measure pain in units, schedules of
payments for pain could be calibrated in terms of those units.
As noted earlier, however, there is much debate about whether people want
to pay for pain-and-suffering insurance."' If people really don't want to insure
against pain and suffering and if these compensation schemes are merely
meant to provide insurance, such compensation schemes need not waste money
on expensive individualized assessments of pain and suffering. Even so,
individualized assessments of pain and suffering would still be desirable in
some cases as evidence of other physical injuries for which people do seek
compensation through insurance.
107 See Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems ofPain, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
239, 257-304 (1991) (discussing the relevance of pain to Social Security and worker's compensation
programs). Under the Social Security Disability Insurance program, pain can be a disabling condition. See,
e.g., Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[P]ain must be constant, unremitting, and
wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment to be disabling."); Smith v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 789, 793 (3d
Cir. 1982) (stating that "pain in itself may be a disabling condition" and that, in any event, it "is a symptom of
a medical impairment").
108 See Pryor, supra note 107, at 240-41.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c) (2006) (providing pricing
schedule for federal employee compensation, including 160 weeks' compensation for loss of an eye and 205
weeks' compensation for loss of a foot).
111 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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e. Pain Relief and False Advertising
While I have principally focused on how new technologies will inform pain
assessment in individual cases, our improved understanding of pain may
influence public sentiment about certain broader policy issues. Consider the
tort of false advertising for products that promote pain relief through a placebo
effect.1 12 In FTC v. QT, Inc., for example, the Federal Trade Commission took
action against the company that marketed "Q-Ray Ionized Bracelets" in a
series of infamous television infomercials.113 The court held that QT engaged
in false advertising by making deceptive or misleading claims that these
"ionized" bracelets relieve pain.114
There are abundant reasons to dislike QT's marketing claims. As one
aspect of the case, however, the court found false QT's claim that medical
research has shown that the bracelets relieve pain. The court relied on
experts who said that, in order to establish the bracelets' ability to relieve pain,
the bracelets had to perform better than a placebo bracelet in a blind research
study.116 Yet, the bracelets may have relieved pain, even if they were no better
than placebos. And QT claimed only to reduce pain, not to reduce pain better
than a placebo.1
17
While some medications treat symptoms through pharmacological
pathways, placebos relieve pain principally by generating the expectation that
they relieve pain.118  Ironically, it is quite possible that the more hyperbolic
QT's claims were, the better the bracelets could relieve pain by reinforcing
expectations of pain relief. If the company did anything to relieve pain, it did
so by using infomercials to generate expectations of relief, not by "ionization"
or other hocus-pocus.
112 I discuss placebo effects in more detail in Adam J. Kolber, A Limited Defense of Clinical Placebo
Deception, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 75 (2007) [hereinafter Kolber, Placebo Deception].
113 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912, 917-18 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
114 Id. at 960-67.
11 Id. at938.
116 Id. at 937-44. The court also noted that when "a product's effectiveness arises solely as a result of the
placebo effect, a representation that the product is effective constitutes a 'false advertisement' even though
some consumers may experience positive results." Id. at 964 (quoting FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088,
1100 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 Id. at 912.
118 Ginger A. Hoffman et al., Pain and the Placebo: What We Have Learned, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED.
248, 257-58 (2005); Donald D. Price & Howard L. Fields, The Contribution of Desire and Expectation to
Placebo Analgesia: Implications for New Research Strategies, in THE PLACEBO EFFECT: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION 117, 117 (Anne Harrington ed., 1997).
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Though many people resist the idea that placebos generate real pain relief,
neuroscientists have bolstered belief in the power of placebos in the face of
recent attacks.119 They have enabled us to better understand and visualize the
mechanisms of placebo pain relief. For example, neuroscientists have used
functional brain imaging to show that placebo treatments reduce activation in
regions of the brain associated with pain, suggesting that placebo effects are
not merely due to biases in the ways that patients report their experiences to
investigators.120 When subjects are exposed to a painful stimulus and given a
pharmacologically inactive cream (which they are deceptively told relieves
pain), they show brain activity similar to that of subjects receiving
pharmacologically active analgesics.121 While we have long known about the
placebo effect prior to recent advances in brain imaging, the neuroscience
research has helped make placebo effects more palpable to those who are
skeptical of hard-to-assess claims of pain relief. If we come to better
appreciate the power of placebo pain relief, we may become less skeptical of
placebo pain relief advertising claims.
In QT, the court noted that "an advertisement will be found misleading and
deceptive if," among other things, it "is likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably under the circumstances."122 Quite possibly, reasonable consumers
are likely to be misled by the claim that a product is an effective pain reliever
when it is no better than a placebo. So I am not criticizing the court's
interpretation of the law. There may also be good policy reasons to prohibit
companies from marketing products that perform no better than placebos,
particularly if the marketing conveys the impression that a product works
better than a placebo.
119 See Asbjorn Hr6bjartsson & Peter C. Gotzsche, Is the Placebo Powerless? An Analysis of Clinical
Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1594, 1595-99 (2001) ("We found little
evidence in general that placebos had powerful clinical effects."); see also Gunver S. Kienle & Helmut Kiene,
The Powerful Placebo Effect: Fact or Fiction?, 50 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1311, 1316 (1997) ("[W]e have
not found any reliable demonstration of the existence of placebo effects.").
120 Wager et al., supra note 38, at 1162; see also Fabrizio Benedetti et al., Conscious Expectation and
Unconscious Conditioning in Analgesic, Motor, and Hormonal Placebo/Nocebo Responses, 23 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 4315, 4315 (2003); Predrag Petrovic et al., Placebo and OpioidAnalgesia-Imaging a Shared
Neuronal Network, 295 SCIENCE 1737, 1737 (2002); Tor D. Wager, The Neural Bases ofPlacebo Effects in
Anticipation and Pain, 3 SEMINARS PAIN MED. 22, 29 (2005).
121 Wager et al., supra note 38, at 1162-63.
122 QT, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (citing FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994), and
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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My point is simply that, even if QT's claims were misleading and entitled
plaintiffs to relief, QT's claims were probably not, strictly speaking, false. 123
As recent neuroscience research confirms, placebos can relieve pain. A
company that markets a placebo by advertising its ability to relieve pain is not
making a false claim, assuming that the particular placebo has the advertised
effect relative to using no treatment at all. Our better understanding of the
subjective experience of pain relief reminds us that, even if good policy
reasons dictate caution when exploiting placebo effects, courts should
recognize that placebo relief is genuine relief.124
2. Emotional Distress
For a long time, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers have
provided expert testimony about litigants' emotional distress, including their
123 In fact, there had been a double-blind, placebo-controlled study of the bracelets conducted by
researchers at the Mayo Clinic. Robert L. Bratton et al., Effect of "Ionized" Wrist Bracelets on
Musculoskeletal Pain: A Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 77 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1164
(2002). You may be surprised to learn that the researchers found "significant improvement in pain scores" in
those who wore Q-Ray bracelets. Id. at 1164, 1166. You probably will not be surprised to learn that they also
found significant improvement in pain scores in the group that wore ordinary bracelets that were not "ionized."
Id. at 1164. As we would expect, the pain relief from the ionized bracelets and the ordinary bracelets was
about the same. Id.
Still, the advertising for Q-Ray bracelets focused on the claim that the bracelets relieve pain, and there
is good reason to believe that they did just that, at least for many purchasers. See id The matter is not entirely
clear, however, because the Mayo Clinic did not even test the right group to establish whether the bracelets
relieve pain. Id. at 1167-68. To make that comparison, the team should have tested a group of subjects that
wore Q-Ray bracelets against a group that wore no bracelets at all. See id. at 1167. Then we could see
whether the bracelets relieved pain through a placebo effect or whether subjects just got better over time.
124 In 2006, the American Medical Association (AMA), the country's largest and most established
professional body of doctors, banned doctors from using placebos deceptively, see CouNcm ON ETHICAL &
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. Ass'N, CEJA REPORT 2-1-06, PLACEBO USE IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (2006). The
AMA banned placebo deception even though doctors administer placebos, in one form or another, quite
frequently. Rachel Sherman & John Hickner, Academic Physicians Use Placebos in Clinical Practice and
Believe in the Mind-Body Connection, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 7, 7 (2008); Jon C. Tilburt et al.,
Prescribing "Placebo Treatments": Results of National Survey of US Internists and Rheumatologists, 337
BRIT. MED. J. 1097, 1098-99 (2008).
By categorically banning deceptive use of placebos, it is now deemed unethical for a doctor to
recommend a QT bracelet or other placebo intervention to a patient, without disclosing-and thereby
eviscerating or at least weakening-the placebo nature of the product. The ban forces us to weigh interests in
autonomy and doctor-patient trust against the beneficial pain-relieving effects of placebos. See Kolber,
Placebo Deception, supra note 112, at 114-16, 125-27. Yet, we cannot balance such interests appropriately
unless we have good measures of placebo pain relief under a variety of conditions-something we can hope
for in our experiential future. While there may be good policy reasons for the court's decision in QT and for
the AMA's prohibition, we should be wary that the prohibition subtly reflects perceptions that placebo relief is
somehow inferior to other forms of pain relief For an in-depth discussion of why we ought not categorically
prohibit use of placebo deception, see id. at 114-27.
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experiences of panic, depression, and anxiety. One way these experts make
assessments of subjective experience is by obtaining litigants' self-reports. But
in forensic contexts, litigants have incentives to lie, and we are disinclined to
trust their claims. While mental health professionals have some methods of
detecting malingering, 125 in the experiential future, they will have far better
methods of diagnosing psychiatric symptoms and estimating their severity,
even when subjects have incentives to lie.
a. Damages for "Suffering"
To be sure, we are just beginning to develop new technologies to assess
emotional distress and related phenomena.126 Researchers are working hard to
identify brain structures or patterns of brain activity associated with particular
emotions and psychiatric disorders.127 Studies looking at brain structure have
found that depression and chronic stress are associated with smaller
hippocampi1 2 8 and that currently depressed subjects have higher amygdala
volumes than healthy subjects. 12 9  Those with post-traumatic stress disorder,
social anxiety disorder, and specific phobias show hyperactivity in the
125 See generally Michael Sharpe, Distinguishing Malingering from Psychiatric Disorders, in
MALINGERING AND ILLNESS DECEPTION 156 (Peter W. Halligan et al. eds., 2003) (describing methods of
detecting feigned psychiatric disorders).
126 Not all advances in our ability to assess the experiences of others will come from neuroscientists. We
know, for example, that people with naturally red hair are more likely to be anxious about visiting the dentist.
Catherine J. Binkley et al., Genetic Variations Associated with Red Hair Color and Fear of Dental Pain,
Anxiety Regarding Dental Care and Avoidance ofDental Care, 140 J. AM. DENTAL Ass'N 896, 897 (2009). A
high percentage of people with naturally red hair (almost all, in one study) have a gene variant that makes
them less responsive to the local anesthetics used by dentists. Id. at 897, 900. Since redheads have been
undermedicated on previous occasions, they are correspondingly more anxious about visits to the dentist. Id.
at 904. The finding led a group of researchers to recommend to dentists that they be especially sensitive to the
management of dental pain and anxiety in those with red hair. Id.
127 See, e.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett et al., The Experience ofEmotion, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 373 (2007);
Ethan Kross et al., Coping with Emotions Past: The Neural Bases of Regulating Affect Associated with
Negative Autobiographical Memories, 65 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 361 (2009); Tor D. Wager et al.,
Prefrontal-Subcortical Pathways Mediating Successful Emotion Regulation, 59 NEURON 1037 (2008); Jamil
Zaki et al., Different Circuits for Different Pain: Patterns of Functional Connectivity Reveal Distinct Networks
for Processing Pain in Selfand Others, 2 Soc. NEUROSCIENCE 276 (2007).
128 See Sonia J. Lupien et al., Stress Hormones and Human Memory Function Across the Lifespan, 30
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 225, 238 (2005) ("[C]hronic exposure to elevated levels of [hormones
released when a person experiences stress] is related to both memory impairments and a smaller volume of the
hippocampus."); Yvette I. Sheline et al., Depression Duration but Not Age Predicts Hippocampal Volume Loss
in Medically Healthy Women with Recurrent Major Depression, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5034, 5039 (1999)
(reporting "smaller hippocampal volumes in subjects with a history of depression").
129 Philip van Eijndhoven et al., Amygdala Volume Marks the Acute State in the Early Course of
Depression, 65 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 812, 815-16 (2009).
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amygdala and insula under functional brain imaging.130 Those with phobias
have atypical brain metabolism and patterns of electrical activity,131 and those
with unipolar depression show different brain activity than those with bipolar
depression.132 Many similar studies that investigate the biology of human
experience have been undertaken or are underway. 133
When plaintiffs suffer as part of some broader tortious injury, they are
frequently entitled to recover damages for their emotional distress. So
technologies that confirm or disconfirm emotional distress or indicate
something about the intensity of a person's distress will have important
applications in the tort context, just like technologies that reveal physical pain.
Emotional harm can also constitute the core of a tortious injury. Under
some circumstances, plaintiffs can sue for intentional or negligent inflictions of
emotional distress. But though tort law generally seeks to compensate people
for their physical and emotional pain, a number of doctrines limit stand-alone
claims of emotional distress. New technologies should eventually spark
revisions to ease these limitations.134 The next two sections explain why legal
doctrine should change as our measurements of emotional distress improve.
130 Amit Etkin & Tor D. Wager, Functional Neuroimaging of Anxiety: A Meta-Analysis of Emotional
Processing in PTSD, Social Anxiety Disorder, and Specific Phobia, 164 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1476, 1482, 1485
(2007).
131 Richard J. Davidson et al., While a Phobic Waits: Regional Brain Electrical and Autonomic Activity in
Social Phobics During Anticipation ofPublic Speaking, 47 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 85, 85 (2000) ("[Social
p]hobics showed a marked increase in right-sided activation in the anterior temporal and lateral prefrontal
scalp regions.").
132 See Janis Kelly, ICBD 2009: fMRI Differentiates Bipolar from Major Depression, MEDSCAPE (July 1,
2009), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/705207.
133 See, e.g., Carmen Andreescu et al., fMRI Activation in Late-Life Anxious Depression: A Potential
Biomarker, 24 INT'L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 820 (2009) (examining event-related fMRI data to identify the
neuroanatomical substrate of late-life anxious depression); Mary L. Phillips & Eduard Vieta, Identifying
Functional Neuroimaging Biomarkers of Bipolar Disorder: Toward DSM-V, 33 SCHIZoPHRENIA BULL. 893
(2007) (discussing the search for neuroimaging evidence to distinguish unipolar and bipolar depression);
Heather L. Urry et al., Making a Life Worth Living: Neural Correlates of Well-Being, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 367,
368-69 (2004) (describing electroencephalographic correlates of self-reported well-being and positive affect);
Thomas Frank, Anxiety-Detecting Machines Could Spot Terrorists, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2008, at 2A
(describing the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to develop a machine that uses "sharp swings in
body temperature, pulse and breathing [to] signal the kind of anxiety exuded by a would-be terrorist or
criminal").
134 See Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort Claims, Am. J.
BIOETHICS, Sept. 2007, at 65, 66; Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and
Directions for Future Scholarship, Am. J. BIoETHIcs, Sept. 2007, at 44, 45-46; A.M. Viens, The Use of
Functional Neuroimaging Technology in the Assessment ofLoss and Damages in Tort Law, Am. J. BIOETHICS,
Sept. 2007, at 63, 65.
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b. Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress limits recovery to
those cases where "extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress."l 35 The bar to recovery is high. As a
comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes: "Liability has been found
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 136
There are two principal reasons for limiting recovery for intentional
inflictions of distress to only the most egregious violations. First, the conduct
must be "extreme and outrageous" and cause "severe" distress because not all
intentional inflictions of distress should generate tort liability.137 Making
someone the butt of a mild joke may intentionally inflict subjective distress,
but the distress may not be severe enough to warrant state intrusion into our
daily lives. In such cases, we limit the scope of the tort, not because we cannot
measure subjective distress, but rather because we can measure it well enough
to decide that the conduct at issue is too minor to warrant state intervention.
The second principal reason for limiting the scope of the tort, however, is
related to measurement difficulties. Courts raise barriers to recovery for
intentional infliction of distress partly out of fear of bogus claims. An early
case to grant recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for
example, warned about "trumped-up claims" that rely only on "subjective
symptoms":
On the whole we see no good reason why a wrongful invasion of
a legal right, causing an injury to the body or mind which reputable
physicians recognize and can trace with reasonable certainty to the
act as its true cause, should not give rise to a right of action against
the wrongdoer, although there was no visible hurt at the time of the
act complained of. Of course, there is always a possibility of
trumped-up claims if there may be a recovery when no evidence of
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law:
Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REv. 789, 798-806 (2007) (describing the elements of an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
137 See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1936) ("Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident
to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law
could ever be.").
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bodily injury can be discovered immediately. However, the matter is
in the control of the trial courts, and verdicts for plaintiffs for any
substantial amounts, when based chiefly on lroof of subjective
symptoms, will not usually be allowed to stand.
While courts are clearly concerned about bogus claims in intentional infliction
of distress cases, those fears should be reduced as we get better at identifying
and assessing genuine cases of emotional distress. As claims of emotional
distress become harder to fake or exaggerate, courts have less reason to
demand the more readily observable proxies for distress that they frequently
require today.
c. Negligent Infliction ofEmotional Distress
Evidentiary barriers to recovery are even clearer in cases of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. As Betsy Grey has argued, such barriers may
be particularly apt to fall in the face of better technology.139 Courts have only
recently permitted recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as
they feared, among other things, that recognizing the action would lead to
frivolous or fraudulent lawsuits.140 Indeed, according to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, one can only recover damages for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress when the distress is accompanied by some more concrete
physical manifestation of harm,141 like nausea, vomiting, or, in some
jurisdictions, nightmares. 142
138 Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 816 (Minn. 1926); see also Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 613,
617 (Md. 1977) (recognizing increasing acceptance of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress but
finding evidence of plaintiff s distress "vague and weak at best").
139 Grey, supra note 134.
140 See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 545 (1994) ("Because the etiology of emotional
disturbance is usually not as readily apparent as that of a broken bone following an automobile accident, courts
have been concerned . .. that recognition of a cause of action for [emotional] injury when not related to any
physical trauma may inundate judicial resources with a flood of relatively trivial claims, many of which may
be imagined or falsified.. .. " (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Maloney v. Conroy, 545 A.2d
1059, 1061 (Conn. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360-61 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (noting that courts limit
recovery for emotional distress in part because of "the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or
imagined"); Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36
ARIz. ST. L.J. 805, 808 (2004) (noting that the difficulty of proving mental injuries makes courts wary of false
claims).
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313(1), 436A (1965); Kircher, supra note 135, at 809.
142 Grey, supra note 134.
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As with intentional inflictions of distress, we limit recovery for negligent
inflictions for multiple reasons. We require physical manifestations of
emotional harm, in part, to limit recovery to the most egregious instances of
negligent conduct. The coercive machinery of the state should only be used to
prohibit especially negligent inflictions of distress. The presence of a physical
manifestation of distress, however, can serve only as a rough proxy for the
severity of the distress. A person contemplating suicide may have no physical
manifestation of his distress, even if his distress is far more severe than the
distress of someone else who happens to have modest physical manifestations.
In the experiential future, we will be hard-pressed to defend physical
manifestation requirements.
We will also be hard-pressed to defend other limits on recovery for
negligent infliction of distress, including requirements in some jurisdictions
that plaintiffs suffer concurrent physical impact or be located within a zone of
danger.143 Physical injury and zone-of-danger requirements presumably
demonstrate that a plaintiff really did suffer from an intense emotional ordeal.
Nevertheless, emotional suffering can be quite severe even absent physical
injury or proximity to injury. And some emotional suffering can be relatively
modest, even if the suffering was generated in a zone of danger or associated
with physical impact. From a theoretical perspective, there are no good
grounds for these requirements unless they are understood as inaccurate
proxies for the measurement of the intensity of a plaintiff s emotional distress.
In the experiential future, such proxies should become less and less important.
B. Punishment Contexts
As noted, black letter tort law requires us to try to measure the experiences
of particular people. Though we often rely on rough proxies for these
experiences, at least the law recognizes their importance to the assessment of
damages. By contrast, even though the harms of crime and punishment consist
largely of bad experiences, our assessments of blameworthiness and
punishment severity in criminal law are far less sensitive to subjective
experience than are our assessments of tort damages. Most criminal statutes
make no explicit reference to the causation of bad experiences. There are
some statutes that are violated when, for example, a defendant causes
143 Kircher, supra note 135, at 810, 815-16.
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"substantial pain,"1 44 but such statutes are more the exception than the rule.
Victim impact gets some attention at sentencing, but only modest investigatory
resources are spent quantifying victim injuries.145 Judges pay even less
attention to the different ways in which offenders experience punishment. 146
will argue that, according to our prevailing justifications of punishment, we are
usually required to take subjective experience into account when making
determinations both of blameworthiness and of punishment severity.
1. Blameworthiness
There are two principal ways in which better monitoring of subjective
experience can improve determinations of blameworthiness. I will first discuss
how assessments of subjective experience can provide evidence about whether
or not a crime occurred and, hence, whether anyone is blameworthy at all.
Then, I will discuss cases in which offenders are clearly blameworthy to some
extent and how new technologies may tell us something about how
blameworthy they are.
a. Whether a Crime Occurred
I have already noted how breath tests can help reveal whether a driver has
committed the crime of driving under the influence.147 Pain assessment
technologies can also help reveal whether a crime has been committed. If
Smith claims that Jones deliberately hit Smith's foot with a hammer,
neuroscience evidence that Smith is not in pain immediately after the alleged
battery could serve as some evidence that no battery occurred. Other
technologies may identify much longer lasting biological markers of
experiences, like childhood physical or sexual abuse, and could be useful not
only in criminal contexts but also in tort and child custody cases.
144 For example, under New York law, a person commits assault in the third degree when he intentionally
or recklessly causes "physical injury to another person," N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.00 (McKinney 2010), where
physical injury is defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain," id. § 10.00(9) (emphasis
added).
145 See generally Erin Ann O'Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 229
(2005) (describing the marginalization of victims in the criminal justice process).
146 Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience ofPunishment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 192-96 (2009)
[hereinafter Kolber, Subjective Experience].
147 See supra Part UI.A.1.a.
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i. Child Physical and Sexual Abuse
Over three million possible cases of child abuse and neglect were referred
to child protective services agencies in the United States in 2009. 14 While
some of these cases may be bogus or otherwise fail to satisfy pertinent legal
standards, a vast number of genuine cases of abuse cannot be proven. 149In
cases of physical abuse, diagnostic images of the brain have long been used in
court. For example, brain imaging is frequently used to provide evidence of
physical trauma to the brain. 1o Evidence of sexual abuse can be more difficult
to find. Occasionally, child sexual abuse can be diagnosed based on unusual
physical or laboratory findings, as when the abuse leads to physical injury,
pregnancy, or disease transmission. But "[s]exual abuse is rarely diagnosed on
the basis of only physical examination or laboratory findings," because
"[p]hysical findings are often absent."151
In many or most cases of childhood abuse, we can gather needed evidence
simply by speaking to the victim. In some cases, however, victims may be too
young to speak, or we may prefer to spare children the obligation to relive their
abuse.152 In other cases, when abuse is alleged to have occurred a long time
ago, the reliability of victims' recollections has been questioned. 153 If there
were practical methods of developing better evidence of victimization, such
methods could be extremely useful in supporting genuine claims of abuse and
in challenging spurious ones.
A growing neuroscience literature suggests that childhood trauma can
affect the development of the brain. The effects of childhood trauma may last
148 CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, at viii
(2009), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf; see also Mark S. Lipian et al.,
Assessing the Verity ofChildren's Allegations ofAbuse: A Psychiatric Overview, 27 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
249, 250-51 (2004).
149 See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 148, at viii.
150 See, e.g., Chapa v. United States, No. 8:04CV376, 2006 WL 1794763, at *1, *9 (D. Neb. June 26,
2006); Middleton v. State, 980 So. 2d 351, 355-59 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, No.
33020-2-II, 2007 WL 1129655, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
Diagnostic Imaging of Child Abuse, 105 PEDIATRICS 1345, 1346-47 (2000).
151 Nancy Kellogg & Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Evaluation of
SexualAbuse in Children, 116 PEDIATRICS 506, 509 (2005); see also Joyce A. Adams, The Role of the Medical
Evaluation in Suspected Child Sexual Abuse, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 231,
232-33 (Tara Ney ed., 1995).
152 Some jurisdictions are especially friendly to hearsay evidence that spares children the obligation to
testify in court about their abuse. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vi) (McKinney 2010).
153 See, e.g., ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY 3-7
(1994).
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into adulthood, even when the childhood trauma left no easily observed
physical injuries. According to neuroscientist Debra Niehoff:
Over the last three decades, both animal studies and clinical research
on human abuse victims have demonstrated that the nervous system
is highly sensitive to stress and trauma during the first years of life,
and that abuse need not involve an actual physical injury to do lasting
damage to the developing brain. Furthermore, trauma-induced
aberrations in neural structure and function are essentially corruptions
of fundamental neural mechanisms evolved to prepare the individual
for survival in dangerous or capricious environments, and they are
not erased by maturation.... Bones mend and bruises fade, but the
harm done to the brain by the experience of violence leaves enduring
scars that, while invisible to the casual observer, have long-lasting
implications for the health, well-being, and social functioning of the
abuse victim. 154
In one recent study, researchers found possible epigenetic markers of
childhood abuse.155 While we inherit our genetic code from our parents, our
genome is subject to so-called epigenetic influence from the environment that
can affect the expression of our genetic traits.156 This particular study looked
at gene expression of glucocorticoid receptors, proteins in cell membranes that
enable our bodies to respond to the stress hormone glucocorticoid. 15
The researchers looked at the level of glucocorticoid receptor expression in
brain tissue of three groups of people: (1) twelve suicide victims with a history
of being abused in childhood, (2) twelve suicide victims without a history of
being abused in childhood, and (3) twelve control subjects who died for other
reasons and had no history of abuse.158 They found a statistically lower level
of glucocorticoid receptor expression in the group of suicide victims with a
history of abuse in childhood than they did in the other two groups. 15 9 By
154 Debra Niehoff, Invisible Scars: The Neurobiological Consequences of Child Abuse, 56 DEPAUL L.
REv. 849, 849-50 (2007); see also Christine Heim et al., Pituitary-Adrenal andAutonomic Responses to Stress
in Women After Sexual and Physical Abuse in Childhood, 284 JAMA 592 (2000); M. B. Stein et al.,
Hippocampal Volume in Women Victimized by Childhood Sexual Abuse, 27 PSYCHOL. MED. 951 (1997).
155 Patrick 0. McGowan et al., Epigenetic Regulation of the Glucocorticoid Receptor in Human Brain
Associates with Childhood Abuse, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 342 (2009).
156 See Fazal Khan, Preserving Human Potential as Freedom: A Framework for Regulating Epigenetic
Harms, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 259,266-71 (2010).
157 See Nick Z. Lu et al., The Pharmacology and Classification of the Nuclear Receptor Superfamily:
Glucocorticoid, Mineralocorticoid, Progesterone, and Androgen Receptors, 58 PHARMACOLOGICAL REv. 782,
784 (2006).
158 McGowan et al., supra note 155, at 343.
159 Id
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contrast, those who committed suicide but had not been abused had no
statistically significant difference in the level of receptor expression than
control subjects. 160
We don't know precisely why these differences were observed, but
whatever the underlying mechanism, the researchers identified possible
biomarkers in the group that committed suicide and had been abused that
varied substantially from the markers in the other groups of subjects. If the
markers are valid and reliable, they might someday help us determine whether
an individual was abused as a child.
To be sure, this study has many limitations. First, it has a small sample
size and has yet to be repeated by other researchers. Second, the data reflect
differences in groups of people and may not be sufficiently fine-grained to
provide useful information about individuals. Third, those who commit
suicide are likely to have suffered more severely than the average victim, so
results might vary in subjects who were less severely victimized. Fourth, the
research is unlikely to distinguish various forms of childhood adversity, so
child physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect might look the same. If a child
witnesses an upsetting, accidental killing, his body might undergo epigenetic
changes like those of children who have been abused. Fifth, the underlying
work on epigenetics is at an early stage, and many basic questions in
epigenetics have yet to be answered. Finally, the research examined brain
tissue from deceased subjects, an approach that cannot safely be used on living
people. While researchers are searching for similar epigenetic markers of
adversity in other tissue, like white-blood cells,161 the technique will have
limited value so long as the only reliable markers of adversity are in brain
tissue.
But under the right circumstances, even epigenetic markers in brain tissue
could prove extremely valuable. Imagine their use in a case based on the life
and death of pop-music legend Michael Jackson. Jackson claimed that he was
repeatedly subject to physical abuse from his father when he was a child.
160 Id. When glucocorticoid receptor genes undergo a process called methylation, the expression of the
gene is reduced. Id. By examining the percentage of sites that were methylated in candidate methylation sites,
the researchers also found a greater percentage of methylation in candidate sites in those who both committed
suicide and were abused than they found in the other groups. Id. at 343 fig.2.a. These methylation biomarkers
may be even more distinctive than biomarkers that merely rely on the level of glucocorticoid receptor
expression.
161 E-mail from Dr. Moshe Szyf, GSK Professor of Pharmacology and James McGill Professor, McGill
Univ., Dep't ofPharmacology & Therapeutics, to author (June 25, 2009, 09:52 EST) (on file with author).
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When Jackson died, he was a single parent with three children of his own. Had
Jackson's father sought custody of Jackson's children, it might be very
important to determine whether or not Jackson's father really did abuse
Jackson in childhood. Since Jackson would have already died prior to this
hypothetical custody battle, it would be relatively easy to examine his brain
tissue for pertinent epigenetic markers of abuse.
Moreover, even if these biomarkers fail to distinguish between various
kinds of childhood adversity, they might still be helpful in court. The presence
of the relevant markers might provide little evidence of Jackson's father's
culpability because the childhood adversity could have had many different
causes or perpetrators. Nevertheless, the absence of the pertinent markers,
assuming the markers prove reliable, could be evidence of the absence of
childhood adversity. So this sort of evidence may be asymmetric; it may be
more helpful to exculpate than inculpate. Still, anything that improves the
accuracy of child abuse cases is an important tool.
b. How Much Blame
So far, I have described how brain-based biological markers associated
with past experiences could support or challenge claims that someone has
engaged in a crime. In other situations, we know that a person has broken a
criminal law but dispute how much punishment he should receive. For
example, in the sentencing phase of death penalty cases, we allow murderers to
introduce evidence of childhood abuse or neglect to argue that they do not
deserve to be executed.162 The harsh circumstances of their youth purportedly
mitigate their blameworthiness. So long as courts permit such evidence,
epigenetic markers of childhood adversity may bear on assessments of
blameworthiness in death penalty cases.
Subjective experience is much more broadly relevant to punishment
severity when we consider victim experiences. As a general rule, the more a
crime victim suffers, the more the perpetrator should be punished. The precise
reasons will vary, however, depending on how one justifies punishment. In the
162 See Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 77
N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (1999) ("Evidence that the defendant was abused as a child is one of the more
intuitively recognizable forms of mitigating evidence. A general societal understanding exists that a person
abused as a child will likely suffer some kind of long-term negative behavioral and perceptual effects."
(footnote omitted)); see also 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265, 1299-1302 (2007) (discussing the use of brain imaging evidence in death penalty cases).
2011] 627
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
next two subsections, I will show why our prevailing theories of punishment,
both retributivist and consequentialist, generally lead to the conclusion that
those who cause more experiential harms should be punished more severely.
These theories imply that assessments of victims' subjective experiences are
often quite relevant to sentencing.
i. Retributivists
According to most retributivists, offenders should be punished in
proportion to their blameworthiness.163 Offenders who commit more serious
crimes like murder or rape should be punished more severely than offenders
who commit less serious crimes like drug possession or prostitution.
Importantly, the seriousness of a crime will depend in important ways on
the experiential harms it causes. To illustrate, suppose that Harsh and Harsher
separately decide to rob elderly men in a park. Each has a choice between
taking $100 from: (a) a man who will be extraordinarily upset by the robbery
for a long time, or (b) a man who will merely be a little upset by the robbery
for a very short time. Assume that both robbers know the emotional responses
of their potential victims. Harsh chooses the victim who will recover quite
quickly, because Harsh simply wants $100 and does not want to cause
unnecessary suffering. Harsher, by contrast, chooses the victim who will be
traumatized by the robbery, either because Harsher prefers to cause his victim
to suffer or because he doesn't care about victim suffering, and so he is
indifferent between the two victims.
In this scenario, Harsher is more blameworthy than Harsh. Surely, much of
the harm of robbery consists of the fear and trauma that robberies cause.
Otherwise, we would treat robbery the same way that we treat lesser forms of
theft that do not involve confrontations. Since Harsh seeks to cause less harm
than does Harsher, Harsh is less blameworthy. If one accepts the retributivist
163 According to John Rawls, retributivists hold that "[i]t is morally fitting that a person who does wrong
should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and
the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act." John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3, 4-5 (1955); see also George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L.
REv. 413, 427-28 (1981) (stating that it is a "basic principle of just punishment" that "[p]unishment must be
proportional to wrongdoing"); Douglas N. Husak, "Already Punished Enough, " 18 PHIL. ToPics 79, 83 (1990)
("A corollary of the 'just deserts' theory is the principle of proportionality, according to which the severity of a
punishment should be a function of the seriousness of the offense."). I use the term "blameworthiness" in the
text to generically capture notions of proportional retribution that depend on "wrongdoing," "the seriousness of
an offense," and other similar phrases.
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view that we should punish in proportion to blameworthiness, then Harsh
should be punished less than Harsher.
Just as tort theorists have different views about when to consider an
action's actual consequences as opposed to its expected consequences, so do
retributivists. On what I call the "only-culpability" view, an offender's
blameworthiness depends only on his mental state with respect to the harm that
he causes or risks causing.164 So, an offender's culpability depends on the
risks of harm that he purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and (perhaps)
negligently accepted by engaging in criminal behavior.165 In the case of Harsh
and Harsher, Harsh knowingly caused some harm to his victim but less than
the harm that Harsher knowingly caused. So Harsh is less blameworthy.
According to the only-culpability view, once we have determined the
pertinent facts about an offender's mental state, the amount of harm he actually
causes is irrelevant to his blameworthiness. On this view, we have no reason
to differentially punish attempted crimes and completed crimes that differ only
in terms of the amount of harm that was unforeseeably caused. So, if an
assassin fires a bullet intending to kill his victim and a bird happens to fly by
and deflect the bullet, the assassin's blameworthiness is in no way reduced
simply because a bird intervened to reduce the harmfulness of the assassin's
action. What matters is the serious risk of death the assassin intentionally
accepted, not the chance forces that determined the outcome.
On another view, call it the "culpability-plus-harm" view, blameworthiness
depends both on the sort of culpability just described, as well as the amount of
harm an offender actually causes. Under this view, the actual results of an
offender's conduct appropriately affect our assessments of his
blameworthiness, even when the results depend in large measure on chance.
According to this view, the assassin's blameworthiness depends quite
importantly on whether or not the bird deflected the bullet. If the bird does not
deflect the bullet, the assassin deserves the very severe punishment associated
with murder. If the bird does deflect the bullet, the assassin deserves the more
modest punishment associated with attempted murder. Under the culpability-
164 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
365 ("Imposing blame and punishment for anything other than intentional action and forbearance is both unfair
and, in most cases, useless.").
165 While some retributivists believe that we can also be culpable for negligently causing harm, others,
like Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, reject that view. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER
FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 69-71 (2009) ("We are not morally culpable for taking risks of which we
are unaware.").
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plus-harm view, the punishment the assassin deserves depends on the bird's
flight path, even though the flight path is beyond the assassin's awareness and
control.
While there is a vociferous debate about whether only culpability counts or
whether harm counts, too,166 both views agree that subjective experience
matters, at least indirectly, to our assessments of how blameworthy a person is.
If one examines culpability plus harm, the actual results of criminal conduct
are directly relevant to assessments of blameworthiness. The more harm one
causes, the more blameworthy he is. Bad subjective experiences are at least
part of the harm that criminals cause, and so such experiences affect their
blameworthiness. Even if Harsh and Harsher did not or could not predict the
differential suffering of their victims, it wouldn't matter: Harsh caused less
harm than Harsher, and so, all else being equal, Harsh is less blameworthy.
Suppose, however, that the culpability-plus-harm view is wrong. Suppose
instead that only culpability counts such that criminal blameworthiness really
depends only on the amount of harm an offender purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently risks causing. If so, the subjective experience of a
victim is not directly relevant to blameworthiness. In that case, if Harsh and
Harsher had no beliefs or intentions about the reactions of their seemingly
identical victims, they would be equally blameworthy despite the fact that they
caused different amounts of harm.
Even on this view, however, the actual experiences of victims are likely to
be indirectly relevant: When we assess the amount of harm an offender
culpably caused or risked causing, our best evidence of the amount of harm he
believed he would cause or risk causing often comes from examining the
amount of harm he actually caused. In real-life cases like that of Harsh and
Harsher, we do not know precisely what offenders believed before they
committed their crimes. But as a general matter, robberies that are more
vicious lead to more emotional harm. So the amount of harm caused by an
offense frequently tells us something, albeit indirectly, about the viciousness or
callousness of an offender.167
166 I discussed the same issue earlier in the tort context. See supra note 77.
167 Of course, if we ever develop reliable methods of lie detection, we could get more pertinent evidence
by asking offenders about their intentions and beliefs at the time of their offenses. Assuming that defendants
still retain their Fifth Amendment rights not to incriminate themselves, however, we may still have to rely on
indirect evidence of culpability by examining harms that offenders actually cause.
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Therefore, regardless of one's views on how harm impacts criminal
wrongdoing, assessments of criminal blameworthiness depend either directly
or indirectly on victims' experiences.168 In the experiential present, it may
simply be too difficult to distinguish people like Harsh and Harsher. In the
experiential future, however, such discriminations will be cheaper and easier to
make. Those who defend proportional punishment will have to use the
technologies that become available or explain why they persist in knowingly
punishing offenders disproportionally.169
ii. Consequentialists
So far, I have discussed the relationship between victim experiences and
blameworthiness and argued that, no matter how one understands
blameworthiness, subjective experience is usually relevant. Not all
punishment theorists agree with retributivists that punishment should be
proportional to blameworthiness. In particular, consequentialists believe that
we punish in order to obtain good consequences. We punish to deter crime,
incapacitate dangerous people, and rehabilitate offenders. 17 0  None of those
consequences depend directly on offenders' blameworthiness. So one might
reasonably ask whether subjective experience matters to consequentialists
when deciding how much punishment is appropriate for an offender.
The answer is that subjective experience matters to consequentialists for a
number of reasons I address more directly in Part III.B.2. For now, I note that
even though blameworthiness is not directly part of the consequentialist
calculus of the amount of punishment that an offender should receive,
blameworthiness is relevant indirectly. All else being equal, it is more
blameworthy to intend or permit larger risks of harms than smaller ones.
Furthermore, people who intend or permit larger risks of harm are usually also
more dangerous. So, even though consequentialists need not worry about
168 My view contrasts with Leo Katz's in his book, ILL-GOTTEN GAINs: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAuD,
AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 145-48 (1996). Katz argues that the extent to which victim preferences
are knowingly frustrated by criminals "need bear absolutely no relationship to the culpability of the
perpetrator." Id. at 151. Yet Katz admits that harm to victims is "one among several criteria of culpability."
Id. So long as harm is one of the criteria of culpability, experiential harms (including the experience of having
one's preferences violated) must bear at least some relationship to perpetrator culpability when these
experiential harms are foreseen by perpetrators (as they are in Katz's examples).
169 Perhaps the best explanation for the failure of criminal law to carefully consider victim experiences is
that the differential treatment of some crime victims can be corrected by the tort system. It is usually quite
difficult, however, to recover damages from criminals.
170 See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 7-8 (1987).
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blameworthiness per se, judgments of blameworthiness are indirectly relevant
to consequentialist determinations about the need to deter and incapacitate
dangerous people. Harsher is not only more blameworthy than Harsh, he is
also more dangerous.
iii. How Sentencing Downplays Subjective Experience
The bottom line is that when assessing how much punishment an offender
should receive, victim experiences are generally relevant whether one is a
retributivist or a consequentialist. Nevertheless, our current sentencing
regimes pay rather little attention to such experiences. We undoubtedly have
laws against theft, assault, and rape, in part, to discourage or punish the
culpable inflictions of distress typically associated with those crimes. And
some statutes define criminal conduct, in part, by reference to victim
experiences.171 But we give relatively little consideration to the amount of
distress that offenders culpably cause or risk causing, and most criminal
statutes make no explicit reference to victims' experiences.
Even statutes that seem to consider victim experiences do so at only the
coarsest levels. For example, we distinguish the crime of simple assault from
the more serious crime of aggravated assault. Aggravated assault typically
refers to assaults with a deadly weapon or with the intent to inflict serious
bodily harm.172 No doubt, aggravated assaults are more likely to cause victims
more severe negative experiences. But even among offenses deemed to be
aggravated assaults, experiential harm to victims varies widely:
In one case, for example, a state court upheld an aggravated assault
conviction, finding (to no surprise) that the victim, who endured
internal bleeding, two heart stoppages during emergency surgery, a
collapsed lung, broken palate, fractured rib, and more than five
months of rehabilitation following a brutal beating, had suffered
"serious bodily injury." The same court upheld an aggravated assault
conviction in another case, ruling that the loss of three teeth and a
scarred lip also constituted "serious bodily injury." 173
At sentencing, assessments of blameworthiness can be more fine-grained. But
even then, we group together conduct that causes quite different levels of
171 For example, California defines the crime of "stalking," in part, by reference to conduct that "seriously
alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes" the victim. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West 2008).
172 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (1980).
173 Robert A. Mikos, "Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal Benefits of Shifting
Crime, 105 MICH. L. REv. 307, 332-33 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
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victim harm. In the aggravated assault cases just described, the defendant who
caused more harm to his victim got a suspended sentence while the defendant
who caused much less harm received a three-year prison sentence. 174
Even rather detailed sentencing provisions probably downplay victim harm.
For example, Texas grades theft crimes a "state jail felony" when they involve
pecuniary losses between $1,500 and $20,000 and provides for a sentencing
range of 180 days to two years in prison for such thefts.175 So there is a
greater-than-tenfold range in the loss amount but only a fourfold range in the
term of imprisonment.176 Even if the harms of theft depend on more than just
the value of goods stolen, it may be difficult to punish offenders proportionally
under this sentencing scheme.177
More pertinently, victims experience their losses quite differently. Though
the Texas statute grades thefts between $1,500 and $20,000 the same way, the
theft of $20,000 from Bill Gates is likely to upset him much less than the theft
of $2,000 from a person with a small net worth. The statute ignores the varied
ways in which victims experience monetary losses. Whatever we ultimately
care about when assessing blameworthiness, the ultimate measure of harm
cannot be denominated in dollars. Dollars do not have intrinsic value; at best,
they serve an instrumental role in helping us obtain ends that are intrinsically
valuable. Amounts of money stolen may serve as reasonably good proxies for
harm, but when theorizing about crime or imagining a future with better
measurement of experiential harms, we must remember that dollar-
denominated penalty systems are, at best, rough proxies for something else we
truly care about.
The fact that we examine victim harm at all implies that the severity of
victim injuries is related at least to some degree to blameworthiness. If victim
harm were entirely unimportant, we might not even distinguish aggravated and
ordinary assaults. But we do make such distinctions because our best theories
174 id
175 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.35(a), 31.03(e)(4) (West 2003). Those who commit state jail felonies
may be fined up to $10,000. Id. § 12.35(b).
176 Id. § 31.03(e)(1)-(7); see also Mikos, supra note 173, at 328-39.
177 The disparity between variation in harm caused and variation in sentence is even more readily apparent
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1l.1(b) (2010)
(advising judges to increase offense levels by 26 for thefts with losses over $100,000,000, 28 for losses over
$200,000,000, and 30 for losses over $400,000,000). Importantly, there are other harms associated with theft
aside from pecuniary loss, and pecuniary loss is at best a rough proxy measure of harm. I discuss pecuniary
loss because that is the harm that theft statutes are most likely to reference, and it is easier to quantify than
some other kinds of harms.
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tell us that we should. And once we acknowledge that victim experiences are
relevant to punishment, we see that there are no good theoretical reasons for
assessing victim harm only in the coarsest manner. Granted, there are good
reasons of cost and administrability for ignoring close differences in victim
experiences. Perhaps our current practices are appropriate in the experiential
present. But in the experiential future, the costs and administrative difficulties
of measuring victim experiences will decrease, and we will have greater reason
to pay more attention to such experiences than we do now.
Importantly, I have not denied the possibility that crimes also cause non-
experiential harms. Compare one victim who is raped and has terrible
memories of the experience to another victim who is raped while unconscious
and never experiences any ill effects from the crime nor discovers that the
crime occurred. The rapist of the first victim is probably more blameworthy
than the rapist of the second victim. The first caused, and likely intended to
cause, much more experiential harm than the second. Nevertheless, most
would say that the second victim has also been seriously harmed by rape, even
though the victim had no conscious experiences of the crime. If all of the
harms from crime were experiential, it would be difficult to explain the harms
of raping unconscious victims.
Yet I have not argued for the strong claim that experiential harms are the
only harms that matter. In Part I, I defended the much more modest claim that
experiences are very important to us, even if our welfare depends on more than
just experiences. Similarly, even if bad things can happen to us that are non-
experiential, as the rape example seems to suggest, the negative experiences of
crime are still a substantial part of the harm of most crimes.
Given that experiential harms constitute at least a substantial part of all
criminal harms, our current practices are difficult to justify. We frequently
treat offenders the same way, even when we know they caused or risked
causing very different amounts of experiential harm; often, we ignore victim
harm entirely. Judges certainly do consider the extent of victim injuries at
sentencing, but they do so with tremendous discretion and little obligation to
gather and discuss victim-impact data. In the experiential future, biological
markers will provide information not only about whether a person committed a
crime, but also about how much harm he caused. We ought to use such
technologies when they become reliable and cost-effective.
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2. Punishment Severity
Once we have decided how blameworthy or dangerous an offender is, we
still must decide how long and how severely to punish him. When discussing
blameworthiness, I focused on how and why we might seek to better measure
the experiences of crime victims. When it comes to punishment, however, the
law is not merely concerned with measuring bad experiences but also with
inflicting those experiences on offenders. If we want the suffering we cause to
be justified, I will argue, we need to know how much suffering we are causing.
So long as our punishments knowingly cause or risk causing substantial
experiential harm, we must monitor the magnitude of those harms to make sure
they do not exceed the amount justified by one's preferred theory of
punishment.178
a. Our Mostly Non-Experiential Punishment Practices
Both of the two principal ways in which theorists have sought to justify
punishment require us to consider the experiences of those we punish. As I
noted earlier, most retributivists believe that we are justified in punishing
offenders because they deserve it. Offenders have done something wrong and
should be punished in proportion to their blameworthiness. Some retributivists
believe that punishment should consist in the intentional infliction of bad
experiences so as to give offenders what they deserve.179 Naturally, those who
view punishment as intentionally dispensing bad experiences must consider the
quantity of bad experiences that are dispensed.
Other retributivists have a more abstract conception of how offenders
should be punished, arguing that offenders should be deprived of certain
liberties.180  Yet even these retributivists must still consider the amount of
experiential suffering that liberty deprivations cause. Even when punishment
is not designed to inflict bad experiences, it nevertheless still causes bad
experiences. The causing of such severe, unpleasant experiences requires
178 provide a much more detailed defense of this claim in Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 146.
179 See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 67 (1973) ("The principle that the wrongdoer
deserves to suffer seems to accord with our deepest intuitions concerning justice."); Herbert Fingarette,
Punishment and Suffering, 50 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHL. Ass'N 499, 499 (1977) ("I would like to
expound a retributivist view of punishment-one that shows why the law must punish lawbreakers, must make
them suffer, in a way fitting to the crime.. .. "); A. M. Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIs 133, 137
(1954) (stating that punishment is "infliction of suffering on the guilty").
180 See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 163, at 10 ("[A] person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally
deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen . . . .").
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justification. So even if we use the term "punishment" to refer to intentionally
caused suffering or deprivation,181 we do not receive a free pass to inflict bad
experiences without justification.
To illustrate, imagine two offenders who are equally culpable and receive
punishments that are alike in all of their objective features (for example, their
cells are the same size, their food is the same, and their terms of imprisonment
are equal). Nevertheless, one of the prisoners, Sensitive, has a much worse
experience of these conditions than does the other, Insensitive.182 Perhaps
Sensitive has borderline claustrophobia, or perhaps he simply grew up living
outdoors and has difficulty adjusting to the cramped, monotonous conditions of
prison.
Some retributivists may claim that Sensitive's experience in prison is
irrelevant because punishment consists of deprivations of liberty, and Sensitive
and Insensitive are deprived of their liberties for the same period of time.
Nevertheless, if retributivists hope to justify punishment, they cannot ignore
prisoner experiences for one simple reason: We must justify not only our
intentional inflictions of punishment but also our knowing inflictions of
punishment. 183  We knowingly inflict distress on Sensitive that we do not
inflict on Insensitive when we deny Sensitive the opportunity to present
evidence of his sensitivity and thereby reduce the duration or harshness of his
confinement. Assuming Insensitive receives the amount of punishment he
deserves, any additional suffering we knowingly cause Sensitive lacks
justification.
To see why we must justify knowing inflictions of suffering, suppose a
prison warden discovers that the water pipes in the prison have been
contaminated with a substance that makes some prisoners extremely anxious
and upset.184 All the prisoners drink the water but only half are sensitive to the
contaminant. The warden can easily turn a valve that will stop the
contamination, but he elects not to. If we need not justify our knowing
1 See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that a central feature of punishment is that it is "intentionally
administered").
182 Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 146, at 183.
183 They must also consider the fact that punishment severity depends on how a punishment changes
offenders from their baseline conditions. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 105. So, ideally, we would
like to know about the baseline experiential states of Sensitive and Insensitive. For simplicity, however, we
can assume that Sensitive and Insensitive have identical baselines and ignore this complication.
184 Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 146, at 197-98.
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inflictions of distress, then the warden's refusal to act requires no justification.
Surely, however, we have the intuition that the warden must justify his
decision. The fact that he merely knowingly inflicted distress is irrelevant.
Knowing inflictions of substantial distress, like purposeful inflictions, require
justification.185
Though the warden's behavior requires a justification, retributivists who
believe that punishment consists of liberty deprivations have none to offer.
Retributivists cannot appeal to the prisoners' desert, since the prisoners are
supposed to be satisfying their desert debt merely by being deprived of their
liberties for the appointed period of time. In fact, retributivists have nothing
else to appeal to-at least those retributivists who, like most, believe that
prison time should be proportional to desert. Thus, whether retributivists
believe that punishment is about inflicting distress or inflicting deprivations of
liberty, they must take account of the amount of distress prisoners actually
experience.
In the warden example, the inmates made anxious by the contaminant
suffer more than the others in ways that are easily foreseen. So the warden
needs to justify his refusal to rectify the problem. Similarly, we must justify
the harsher treatment of offenders like Sensitive who foreseeably face greater
difficulties in prison for equally arbitrary reasons, like having grown up
spending a lot of time outdoors. After all, nothing about the warden example
implies that the levels of anxiety and emotional trauma of the prisoners who
receive contaminated water exceed the levels of anxiety and emotional trauma
that we currently see everyday among sensitive prisoners.
Even if prisoners were aware of their own sensitivities to prison before they
committed their crimes, such awareness would not eliminate the
disproportionality of their sentences. We could punish murders by left-handed
people with two years in prison and murders by right-handed people with
twenty years in prison. Offenders would have advance notice of their
punishments, but their punishments would still violate common retributive
commitments to proportionality. 186
The second major way that theorists have sought to justify punishment, as
noted earlier, is on consequentialist grounds. According to most
185 id.
186 Id. at 210-11.
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consequentialists, punishment itself is a bad thing.187  Punishment may be
justified, however, provided that it causes other good consequences. For
example, punishment can deter crime, incapacitate dangerous people, and
maybe even rehabilitate offenders.
Consequentialists must not only attend to prisoners' anticipated
punishment experiences but must also consider their actual punishment
experiences because most consequentialists treat punishment itself as a prima
facie bad thing.188  Consequentialists weigh the harms of punishment against
the expected benefits. Since the harms of punishment include its associated
bad experiences, we cannot weigh costs and benefits unless we know how
much distress punishment causes. For example, the benefits from imprisoning
Sensitive and Insensitive may be the same, but all else being equal, the
consequentialist costs of imprisoning Sensitive are higher because he
experiences more distress. Failure to consider the ways offenders vary in their
experiences of punishment will lead to incorrect consequentialist outcomes.
Even though our leading theories of punishment, both retributivist and
consequentialist, require us to consider offenders' experiences, in fact, we
usually ignore these experiences, at least officially. While judges can and
sometimes do take variation in offenders' likely punishment experiences into
account at sentencing, they rarely document such decisions. Moreover, the
influential Federal Sentencing Guidelines have long advised judges to ignore
certain offender characteristics that might provide information about offenders'
future punishment experiences. 189 Recent amendments to the guidelines have
increased judges' leeway to consider these characteristics, though they still
substantially limit judges' discretion.190
187 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 182
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789) (seeking to minimize the pain and suffering of punishment).
188 There are, however, nontraditional versions of consequentialism that, like retributivism, treat deserved
punishment as a good thing, as discussed in MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAw 155-59 (1997), and in Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U.
L. REv. 815, 833-36 (2007).
189 For example, the 2009 Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that: "Age (including youth) is not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted," U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5H1.1 (2009); "[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted," unless they affect culpability, id § 51H1.3; and "[p]hysical condition or appearance,
including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted," id.
§ 5H1.4.
190 The 2010 Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that: "Age (including youth) may be relevant in
determining whether a departure is warranted if considerations based on age, individually or in combination
with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical
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Nevertheless, there are cases where courts recognize objective differences
in prison conditions that surely affect prisoners' subjective experiences. For
example, courts have reduced sentences for prisoners especially vulnerable to
abuse in prison who, for their own safety, are likely to be placed in special
administrative segregation units that are both objectively and subjectively
harsher places to serve prison time. 191
In still rarer cases, courts may consider differences in experiences of
confinement even absent blatantly different objective conditions of
confinement.192 An Australian court, for example, appealed to an Aborigine's
likely subjective experience to justify giving him a shorter sentence than other
Australians would receive. According to the court:
[I]n sentencing an Aborigine who has come from a deprived
background or is otherwise disadvantaged by reason of social or
economic factors or who has little experience of European ways, a
lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly, even unduly,
harsh when served in an environment which is foreign to him and
which is dominated by inmates and prison officers of European
background with little understanding of his culture and society or his
own personality.193
cases covered by the guidelines." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5111.1 (2010). Similar revisions
were made to provisions covering other offender characteristics, including their "[m]ental and emotional
conditions," id. § 5111.3, and "[p]hysical condition or appearance," id. § 5111.4.
191 See United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 211-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), af'd, 166 F.3d 1202 (2d Cir.
1998); see also United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (allowing extreme vulnerability
to assault in prison as a ground for reducing a sentence but noting that the "vulnerability must be so extreme as
to substantially affect the severity of confinement such as where only solitary confinement can protect the
defendant from abuse").
192 For example, in United States v. McIlrath, 512 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2008), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the defendant's forty-six month sentence for traveling across state
lines to have sex with a minor, despite a psychologist's testimony about the defendant's poor coping skills and
high likelihood of being targeted by other prison inmates. Id. at 422. Though the case was affirmed, the court
at least acknowledged the potential relevance of the defendant's sensitivity. Writing for the panel, Judge
Richard Posner stated that "[t]he defendant's history and characteristics were relevant in possibly suggesting
both that imprisonment would be a more severe punishment for him than for the average Internet sexual
predator," though "[a]s far as we know or the defendant's lawyer or psychologist attempted to show, the
average man who trolls for young girls in Internet chat rooms is no better adjusted than the defendant." Id. at
423-24.
193 R v Stanley Edward Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 62-63 (Austl.). The court's statement that "a
lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly (even unduly) harsh" suggests (but does not conclusively
demonstrate) that the court was considering the defendant's likely experiences in prison.
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Though the court restricted its claims to the circumstances of this particular
offender, there are no obvious principles for considering subjective experience
under just these sorts of circumstances.
Were we to consider the subjective experience of prisoners, we would rely
on many of the current and futuristic techniques that I discussed in the context
of emotional distress.194 In the near future, we would consider expert
assessments of distress, depression, panic, and anxiety, if we believe that such
assessments can uncover malingerers. In the experiential future, we may rely
on technologies that examine structural or functional features of the brain to
help assess an offender's distress level or susceptibility to severe distress.
Difficult as it would be to assess the subjective experience of prisoners, it
would surely not be impossible. After all, we at least purport to make such
assessments every day in the tort system. In cases of wrongful imprisonment,
for example, we even purport to assess the negative experience of confinement
in small spaces. 19 5 Rather than hinging compensation merely on the number of
hours or days that a plaintiff is falsely imprisoned, we purport to recognize the
plaintiffs individualized amount of suffering. In a world with better methods
of measuring suffering, there is no good reason, aside from cost, to measure
individualized experiences in tort law but not in criminal law.
b. The Special Case ofLethal Injection
There is one punishment context where courts have taken seriously the
anticipated experiences of those about to be punished. Over the last century,
reformers have sought more humane forms of execution. In the years leading
up to the twentieth century, "hanging was the nearly universal form of
execution," 196 until it was gradually replaced by electrocution under the "well-
grounded belief that electrocution is less painful and more humane than
hanging." 197 Over the last thirty years, most states with a death penalty began
194 See supra Part II.A.2.
195 See, e.g., Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The plaintiff is entitled to
compensation for loss of time, for physical discomfort or inconvenience, and for any resulting physical illness
or injury to health. Since the injury is in large part a mental one, the plaintiff is entitled to damages for mental
suffering, humiliation, and the like." (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, § 11, at 48) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
196 State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922, 934 (Wash. 1981); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
197 Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).
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to rely on lethal injection as a still safer, less painful alternative to
electrocution. 198
Debate continues to swirl around lethal injection as death row inmates
argue in court that lethal injection protocols risk causing them excruciating
pain. These protocols usually include the administration of three drugs. The
first, sodium thiopental, anesthetizes the person. The second, pancuronium
bromide, paralyzes him. And the third, potassium chloride, stops his heart.199
If an executionee is not properly anesthetized during the first part of the lethal
injection process, he will subsequently be injected with the paralytic agent that
will make him physiologically incapable of communicating his pain during the
rest of the execution. Deborah Denno describes concerns about use of the
paralytic agent pancuronium bromide:
Without adequate anesthesia, pancuronium can cause an inmate
excruciating pain and suffering because the inmate slowly suffocates
from the drug's effects while paralyzed and unable to cry out. Such
agony is increased all the more when executioners inject the third
drug, potassium chloride, which creates an intense and unbearable
burning. There is agreement that if the [anesthetic] sodium thiopental
is ineffective, it would be unconscionable to inject the second and
third drugs into a conscious person. A key issue in litigation is
whether prison officials and executioners can determine if an inmate
is aware and in torment because the pancuronium is such a powerful
mask of emotions. 200
The lethal injection debate is about the risk of causing inmates excruciating
pain, and new technologies to measure the experiences of executionees have
been brought to bear.201 In 2006, Willie Brown, Jr. claimed that North
Carolina's lethal injection protocol was constitutionally defective. In the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Brown argued "that
the State will use an inadequate protocol for anesthesia as a precursor to
carrying out his death sentence, and that as a result he faces an unacceptable
and unnecessary risk of suffering excruciating pain during his execution in
198 Baze, 553 U.S. at 42-44.
199 Deborah W. Denno, Introduction, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701, 702 (2008) (introducing the Fordham
Urban Law Journal's symposium issue on "The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science").
200 Id
201 Robert Steinbrook, New Technology, Old Dilemma-Monitoring EEG Activity During Executions, 354
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2525 (2006); see also Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine
Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (2007).
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violation of the Eighth Amendment." 202 The district court decided that there
were "substantial questions as to whether North Carolina's execution protocol
creates an undue risk of excessive pain."203 Brown's execution was permitted
to proceed provided execution personnel would be "present and accessible to
[him] throughout the execution ... with sufficient medical training to ensure
that [he] is in all respects unconscious prior to and at the time of the
administration of any pancuronium bromide or potassium chloride." 204
To satisfy its obligation to the court, the state agreed to have Brown's
execution monitored by a nurse and a physician using a device called a
bispectral index monitor.205 A bispectral index monitor uses
electroencephalography to monitor electrical activity in a subject's brain.206
The device is supposed to provide anesthesiologists with a measure of
anesthetic depth to help them determine if patients' anesthesia is working
properly.207 If it accomplished its intended purpose in the execution context, it
would help those engaged in the lethal injection process to determine whether
an executionee has received the appropriate level of anesthesia such that he
will not be in pain during execution. In Brown's case, the court allowed his
execution to proceed based, in part, on the state's assertion "that a licensed
registered nurse and a licensed physician will be positioned in the observation
room where they can both observe and read the values of the BIS monitor."208
In some respects, the technological monitoring of executions could be
viewed as a step toward our experiential future. While the state takes a life, the
state's agents monitor the executionee's level of awareness and, by
implication, his level of pain. A retributivist who believes that loss of life (and
loss of life alone) is an appropriate, proportional punishment for a death row
inmate should support the idea of monitoring lethal injections. Any pain from
the injection itself would be disproportional suffering for such a retributivist, at
least in a world where we have relatively easy ways of knowing the level of an
executionee's pain.
202 Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 753 (4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting).
203 Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06CT3018, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006).
204 id
205 Steinbrook, supra note 201, at 2527.
206 id
207 id.
208 Andrea Weigl, Doc's Execution Role: "Be Present," NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30,
2007, at Al (quoting Judge Malcolm J. Howard's April 17, 2006 order) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, the physician present at Brown's execution apparently did not monitor the machine, possibly in
violation of the court's order. Id.
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Similarly, in a world where anesthetic depth can be cost-effectively
monitored, consequentialists should also support monitoring the pain of lethal
injection. The pain of execution with insufficient anesthesia would be
excruciating, yet would have no deterrent, incapacitative, or rehabilitative
effect on the executed offender. Painful executions might deter others from
committing death-penalty-eligible crimes, but that is an argument for reducing
anesthesia, not for declining to monitor whatever pain we do cause.
If Willie Brown's case was a step toward our experiential future, however,
it was at most a small one. In a recent Supreme Court case, Baze v. Rees, the
Court rejected the need for bispectral index monitoring.209 In that case, two
death row inmates claimed that Kentucky's lethal injection protocol constituted
"cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment "because of the
risk that the protocol's terms might not be properly followed, resulting in
significant pain." 2 10  Among their claims, they argued that Kentucky's
execution protocol should require states to use technologies, like a bispectral
211index monitor, to measure anesthetic depth. Ultimately, the Court, in a
three-Justice plurality opinion, wrote that Kentucky's lethal injection
procedure did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.212  The plurality
noted that Kentucky already had sufficient precautions to ensure delivery of
the appropriate amount of anesthesia and noted that the bispectral index
monitor had yet to be endorsed by the medical community as a whole.213 The
plurality also noted that requiring use of a device like a bispectral index
monitor would effectively halt executions because the device is supposed to be
read by anesthesiologists, yet anesthesiologists are prohibited by Kentucky law
and by their code of conduct from participating in executions.214
Even though the Court in Baze determined that the Constitution does not
require more stringent monitoring of the lethal injection protocol in Kentucky
215
and in those states with a "substantially similar" protocol, most of the Court
seemed to agree that the Constitution limits the acceptable level of pain that
209 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526-27 (2008) (plurality opinion).
210 Id. at 1526.
211 Id. at 1536.
212 Id. at 1538.
213 Id. at 1536 (citing Task Force on Intraoperative Awareness, Am. Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, Practice
Advisory for Intraoperative Awareness and Brain Function Monitoring, 104 ANESTHESIOLOGY 847, 855
(2006)).
214 id.
215 Id. at 1537.
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can be risked when engaging in lethal injection.216 Had a better, cheaper
technology been available to monitor the subjective experience of those being
executed, one that did not require a doctor's supervision, the case may have
come out differently.
The claim that we must better monitor the experiences of those who are
punished may not be a popular one. Many find it distasteful to hook people up
to machines to see how they are experiencing the unpleasant things we do to
them. While such aversion is understandable, it must be resisted because it has
the wrong target. We may understandably be troubled by the state's
purposeful or knowing inflictions of harm on offenders. But once we decide as
a society to permit such inflictions, we are obligated to monitor the amount of
harm inflicted, at least when we can do so cost effectively. We must
distinguish our understandable distaste for the nasty business of making people
suffer from our moral obligation to make sure that people are not suffering
excessively.
3. Interrogation and Torture
In the nasty business of intentionally making people suffer, there is no
activity more vicious than torture. Torture has been prominently defined in
terms of the infliction of bad experiences. The United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment prohibits "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
217physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person" by a state actor.
Similarly, federal criminal law in the United States prohibits torture, defined as
"an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain
or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his
216 See id. at 1532 (stating the plurality's view that, absent a legitimate penological justification for some
method of execution, condemned prisoners can challenge it by presenting another method that is "feasible,
readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain"); id. at 1563 (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that the Court should review claims that a
method of execution is unconstitutional by considering "whether the method creates an untoward, readily
avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary suffering"); id. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (voicing
agreement "with petitioners and the plurality that the degree of risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of
alternatives must be considered" when evaluating the constitutionality of a method of execution).
217 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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custody or physical control."218 These provisions make clear that the
intentional infliction of negative experiences constitutes the central harm that
torture prohibitions are trying to prevent.
Earlier, I noted how technology may help us determine whether a crime has
occurred. Torture provides another example. New technologies can help us
determine whether an alleged torture victim has actually been tortured. One
research group recently used magnetoencephalography, a technique similar to
electroencephalography, to examine the long-term effects of torture on
victims' brain waves.219 The researchers found dysfunctional brain wave
activity in those who experienced torture that was not present in healthy
subjects.220 Research like this could someday lead to technologies that support
or cast doubt on claims that a person was severely tortured and thereby provide
helpful evidence in war-crime proceedings, asylum applications, tort suits, and
other venues.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge when it comes to torture, however, is
determining when a so-called enhanced interrogation technique causes so
much distress that its intentional use should be deemed torture. One way to
protect interrogatees from torture is to prohibit interrogation techniques that
are likely to cause extreme pain or suffering. For example, when a person is
waterboarded, he is strapped down on an incline, with his feet elevated above
his head, while water is poured over his face to give him the sensation that he
is drowning.221 Prohibiting waterboarding may be one good method of
prohibiting behavior likely to lead to extreme pain or suffering.
Importantly, however, a ban on a particular interrogation technique is still a
very rough proxy approach. Whether or not waterboarding causes legally
impermissible pain and suffering depends on how we expect particular
interrogatees to experience waterboarding, and their reactions will vary to
some degree. An interrogatee who developed post-traumatic stress disorder
from having nearly drowned in a swimming pool as a child will react
differently to waterboarding than will a United States Marine who has
218 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006). Interestingly, the prohibition's exception of "pain or suffering incidental
to lawful sanctions" seems to recognize, as I argued earlier, that criminal punishment intentionally or at least
foreseeably causes bad experiences. Id.
219 William J. Ray et al., Decoupling Neural Networks from Reality: Dissociative Experiences in Torture
Victims Are Reflected in Abnormal Brain Waves in Left Frontal Cortex, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 825 (2006).
220 Id. at 827.
221 Kermit Roosevelt III, Detention and Interrogation in the Post-9/11 World, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 6
n.35 (2008).
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advanced training in how to resist waterboarding interrogations. In other
words, the public debate about torture focuses on whether some technique, in
the abstract, is permissible, when what really matters depends on (an
interrogator's beliefs about) an interrogatee's experiential responses. Those
responses depend on the relationship between the interrogatee and the way he
is treated, not just the method of interrogation in the abstract.
Given the inadequacy of current technology to assess experiences, we may
need to prohibit broad categories of enhanced interrogation like waterboarding.
We may also fear that those tasked with measuring distress levels will simply
rubber stamp torture (though if people can be dishonest about measuring
distress, they can be dishonest about what categories of interrogation they
use).222
But if we had sufficiently reliable technologies to measure acute distress,
we could further protect interrogatees by stipulating maximum levels of
distress an interrogatee is permitted to experience.223 In this regard, our
experiential future may be close at hand. It is almost certainly easier to
measure acute distress than chronic distress. We already have some biological
markers of acute distress, like pulse, blood pressure, levels of stress hormones,
galvanic skin response, and others.224
As noted above, the idea that we should measure the acute distress of
interrogatees seems disturbing. The harm caused by inflicting some amount of
distress, however, is far more troublesome than the comparatively slight
invasion caused by measuring it. If we are permitted to engage in some
behavior that is likely to cause distress, then we are permitted to measure the
distress we cause. The reason that the measurement of distress seems so
222 Jurisdictions might also adopt procedures to ensure that the party that measures distress is independent
of the party that conducts the interrogation.
223 Importantly, it is not sufficient to merely protect interrogatees' health, for such protections may still
permit excessively distressful treatment. In Public Committee Against Torture v. Prime Minister, for example,
Israel's High Court of Justice discussed directives issued by the country's General Security Service that
described permissible occasions for interrogators to use harsh tactics, including an especially distressing tactic
known as "shaking." HCJ 5100/94 IsrSC 567, 577-78 [1999]. According to the Court, the directives provided
that before shaking, "the investigator must first provide an evaluation of the suspect's health and ensure that no
harm comes to him or her." Id. at 578. But even if the directives protect interrogatees against long-term health
risks, interrogatees may still suffer impermissible, intense physical or emotional distress during shaking.
224 See, e.g., Germaine M. Buck Louis et al., Stress Reduces Conception Probabilities Across the Fertile
Window: Evidence in Support ofRelaxation, FERTILITY & STERILITY 1-2 (2010) (using salivary cortisol and a-
amylase to measure stress levels); Simpson, supra note 67, at 491 (noting that autonomic arousal has been
measured using "pulse rate, respiration, blood pressure, and sweating (variously known as the galvanic skin
response [GSR], skin conductance response [SCR], or electrodermal activity)").
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troubling is that it forces us to palpably recognize our participation in the nasty
business of intentionally making others suffer. Measuring distress is not the
principal act of harm, however. Measurement merely forces us to confront and
better quantify what is always happening when a person is subjected to
enhanced forms of interrogation. By way of rough analogy, consider the sport
of boxing, where participants intentionally cause each other substantial
suffering. There may be good arguments for banning the sport entirely. But
once we permit the activity to proceed, we affirmatively ought to have an
official who is trained to end a fight when a boxer's suffering becomes too
dangerous or distressing.
Of course, if one believes that a particular instance of intentionally caused
suffering is illegal or immoral, then one should also oppose measuring its
severity when the act of measuring is a form of aiding or participating in the
infliction. Many people believe that some psychologists who aided the CIA
during post-9/11 interrogations should be criminally punished or at least
professionally disciplined for their assistance.225 Such judgments make sense
if these psychologists participated in or helped plan acts of torture. But we
should not feel the same way about psychologists who attend interrogations
when their participation does not aid or abet torture. So, for example, if a
police department hires a psychologist to monitor its interrogations-and there
is no reason to think that officers plan to use more intense interrogations as a
result-the act of monitoring is less likely to be troublesome. It may even be a
commendable safety precaution.
C. The Experiential Gap Between Tort Law and Criminal Law
Tort law pays much more attention to bad experiences than criminal law
does. In tort law, experiences matter, both in terms of actual doctrine and our
justifications of doctrine. True, it is difficult to identify physiological markers
of current or past experiences, so it is not surprising that tort law often resorts
to rough proxy measurements (by considering, for example, whether plaintiffs
were in a zone of danger or had physical manifestations of distress). These
inexact proxies for bad experiences reduce the likelihood that litigants will
225 See Leonard S. Rubenstein & Stephen N. Xenakis, Doctors Without Morals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2010, at A27 (arguing that government agencies, state licensing boards, or professional medical societies
should investigate doctors and psychologists who may have participated in or authorized acts of torture of
detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere); Scott Shane, 2 U.S. Architects ofHarsh Tactics in 9/11's Wake,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, at Al (noting that two psychologists who assisted the CIA's interrogation program
after the attacks on September 11, 2001, may face criminal charges).
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invent or exaggerate their symptoms. But at least in tort contexts, the law
purports to care about individualized measurements of harm. If a person is
falsely imprisoned, he can sue for the amount of harm that he experienced.
There is no general formula that converts objective measurements, like the
number of hours falsely imprisoned and the dimensions of confinement, into
226
amounts of compensation.
Though we frequently fail to recognize it, experiences also matter in
criminal contexts. Technologies better able to assess experience can help us
decide when a crime occurred, how blameworthy the perpetrator was, and how
much punishment he should receive. If we can measure the harms of false
imprisonment to individual tort plaintiffs (who have incentives to lie), then we
can calculate the severity of confinement experienced by particular prisoners.
Moreover, we usually say that criminal defendants are entitled to more process
than tort plaintiffs, not less. While we presumably don't want to spend the
money to make such assessments of prisoners, we should stop pretending that
rough subjective assessments are impossible: they just cost more than we are
willing to spend.
D. Why the Experiential Future Matters Now
To sum up the current state of technology, a lot of research has suggested
methods of making better inferences about subjective experience. Much of
this research, however, tells us something about people in general and is not
yet sufficiently powerful or reliable to use in individual cases. In order to be
useful in the courtroom, we need to continue to refine and test technologies to
enable us to make reasonably accurate inferences about the experiences of
particular individuals, even when they have incentives to lie.
But even if many of the technologies I discuss never pan out, others that
have yet to be discovered will certainly prove useful. In all likelihood, we will
eventually combine a wide variety of technologies to help us make more
confident assessments of subjective experience than we can with any single
technology.
When we look at current research from a bird's eye view, a picture of our
experiential future emerges. The picture interests us, in part, simply because
we want to know what the future will be like. There are four principal reasons,
226 See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 105, at 1574.
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however, why our experiential future matters today, even though the most
dramatic technological advances are still in the future.
First, many of the technologies discussed raise important issues about the
227privacy of our thoughts and experiences. Our privacy interests in our
physical and emotional pain are not especially strong to the extent that we
already require litigants to submit to invasive medical examinations in order to
prove their claims.228 And in contexts where the government causes suffering,
like punishment and enhanced interrogation, the invasion of privacy required
to measure experiences is small relative to the invasiveness of the suffering
itself.
In other contexts, however, privacy interests in our experiences may be
quite substantial and controversial. For example, researchers have made
progress in identifying the neural correlates of racial bias22 9 and sexual arousal
230
and orientation. Sexually aroused pedophiles show a different pattern of
brain activation than do sexually aroused nonpedophiles.231 Thus, we have
reason to begin thinking about the privacy protections that will apply to such
technologies.
Moreover, privacy concerns can arise long before new technologies are
developed. As I noted earlier, the mere possibility that we will develop
accurate lie detectors in the future should change our behavior today because
we might be asked about our current behavior on some distant, future
232
occasion. Precisely how such technologies should change our behavior
depends, in part, on whatever future privacy protections we think we will have.
So our beliefs about the privacy protections accompanying future technologies
may affect our behavior even today.
227 See generally Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 451-55.
228 FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a)-(b) ("[A] party whose mental or physical condition ... is in controversy [may be
ordered] to submit to a physical or mental examination ... on motion for good cause . . . ").
229 See, e.g., William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing ofBlack and
White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806 (2004); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of
Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000); Mary E. Wheeler
& Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype
Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SC. 56 (2005).
230 See, e.g., Bruce A. Arnow et al., Brain Activation and Sexual Arousal in Healthy, Heterosexual Males,
125 BRAIN 1014 (2002); Jorge Ponseti et al., A Functional Endophenotype for Sexual Orientation in Humans,
33 NEUROIMAGE 825 (2006).
231 Martin Walter et al., Pedophilia Is Linked to Reduced Activation in Hypothalamus and Lateral
Prefrontal Cortex During Visual Erotic Stimulation, 62 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 698 (2007).
232 See supra Part II.B.2.
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Second, by looking toward the experiential future, we can help guide
research into new technologies in ways that will benefit the legal system. For
example, I noted that quite a bit of research looks at experiential differences in
groups of people, but far less identifies experiential differences among
individuals. Identifying individual differences is more expensive and more
difficult technologically. Moreover, scientists have less incentive to develop
individualized measurements than lawyers do. An ambitious neuroscientist
might search for the region of the brain generally associated with some
experience and then move on to another issue, rather than seek to refine the
methodology and statistical power of an experiment to look for differences at
the individual level that can be used in court. The legal profession can help
identify applications of new technologies that would be especially beneficial.
The third principal reason our experiential future matters today is that our
failure to direct the development of the experiential future may delay the
development of technologies that are quite valuable from a societal perspective
but are politically unpopular and unlikely to garner the interests of the research
community. For example, I described how epigenetic evidence may someday
give us reason to believe that a person was not a childhood victim of severe or
repeated neglect or abuse.233 I noted that such tools may only provide
evidence asymmetrically: they may tell us that an alleged perpetrator is
innocent, even if they are incapable of telling us that an actual perpetrator is
guilty. Such a technology could be enormously valuable to society if it
reduces the risk that innocent people are erroneously sent to prison.
Nevertheless, because alleged child abusers are not politically well organized,
they are unlikely to lobby for funds or form large foundations that can
underwrite expensive research.
Neuroscience research is particularly expensive. It costs over $500 per
hour to scan one subject in an fMRI machine.234 Since researchers depend
heavily on grant money, some important but unpopular research may be
underfunded. By drawing attention to possible forensic uses of new
technologies, we can hope to steer the course of research in promising (but
likely overlooked) directions.
Finally, and most importantly, our experiential future matters today
because it illuminates how we often hide our need for better information about
233 See supra Part JH.B.1.a.i.
234 See, e.g., fRJ Lab Policies, MICH. FMRI LAB, http://www.umich.edu/fmri/policies.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2011).
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experiences by using rough proxies for those experiences. For example, we
determine whether a person was tortured by examining the techniques that
were used on the alleged victim rather than the individualized amount of
distress he experienced (or was expected to experience). Because the law
developed over hundreds of years without good technologies to assess
experience, objective approaches to the law predominate, in ways that are often
unseen and unconsidered. By considering our experiential future, we gain a
better appreciation of the importance of subjective experience to the law even
today.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that, even though experiences are critically important to our
lives and to our best theories of what the law should consider, in many
respects, the law ignores our experiences or uses very rough proxies to take
them into consideration.
Among the many claims in this Article, I have argued that, in the
experiential future: (1) the tort system should develop more objective units to
describe pain and other forms of suffering; (2) worker's compensation and
other administrative compensation schemes should arguably consider actual
amounts of pain and suffering rather than merely consulting objectively
defined compensation schedules; (3) the law of deceptive advertising should at
least recognize that placebo pain relief is real relief, even if there are still good
policy reasons to prohibit advertising that leaves a false impression about a
product's efficacy relative to a placebo; (4) claims for negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress should rely less on doctrines that limit
recoveries to the most extreme cases; (5) the criminal justice system should
continue to develop new methods of assessing whether crimes occurred and the
nature of the experiential harms they caused; (6) sentencing should pay greater
attention to the amount that offenders suffer as a result of punishment, not only
in the context of executions, but in general; and (7) policies against torture
should not rely solely on banning particular categories of interrogation but
should also consider the amount of experiential distress a particular
interrogatee undergoes.
This list provides just a short sample of the many ways in which the legal
system should change in the experiential future. While we still have to wait for
practical, reliable methods of assessing the full range of human experiences,
we will not have to wait long for some of these technologies, in primitive form,
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to be tested in court. In the meantime, we should more carefully scrutinize
those areas of the law where our best theories require us to pay more attention
to subjective experience.
